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1. The institutional context 
1.1. Judicial structure overview 
In Hungary a four-level judicial system operates. The system is unitary, i.e. there are no courts 
(specialized courts) outside of the courts hierarchy described below. However, there is a horizontal 
division of labor amongst judges in each court (a judge has to deal with cases only from a given 
branch of the law). The main dividing line is between judges who adjudicate in criminal cases and 
those who deal with non-criminal cases (civil, economic, and administrative and labor cases). This 
kind of division of the labor (specialization on the level of individual judges) is reflected in the 
horizontal organization of the judicial administration: in higher courts criminal, civil, economic as 
well as administrative and labor judicial departments (sections) operate. The sections organize and 
support judges adjudicating in one of the before-mentioned branches of the law. 
 
On the lowest level of the hierarchy the district courts and the administrative and labor courts take 
place.1 There are 112 district courts in Hungary. The district courts proceed only as first instance 
courts. Separated from the general district courts there are 20 specialized courts in the first level of 
court hierarchy: they are administrative and labor courts located in the seat of regional courts. 
District courts and administrative and labor courts are led by a president. These courts are not legal 
entities; however they have some limited autonomy in their external relationship under the control of 
the president of the regional court they belong to. As for the general administration of district courts 
presidents and judicial councils of the regional courts play a central role. 
 
Regional courts constitute the second level of the courts, there is one in each of the 19 counties of 
Hungary and one in Budapest. The regional courts operate as first instance courts in some types of 
cases of greater significance, and decide in appeal cases lodged against the decisions of district courts 
and administrative and labor courts. Regional courts are led by a president, and these courts are legal 
entities. 
 
Regional courts of appeal are at the third level. Regional courts of appeal decide as a second or third 
instance only in appeal cases submitted against the decisions of regional courts. Regional courts of 
appeal are led by a president, and they are also legal entities. 
 
The Curia of Hungary (Supreme Court) is the highest judicial authority in Hungary. Horizontally, 
it is divided into three departments: criminal, civil, and administrative and labor law departments. 
The Curia decides appeals submitted against the decisions of the regional courts and the regional 
courts of appeal in certain types of cases and reviews final decisions of lower courts if these are 
challenged through an extraordinary remedy. 
                                                 
1http://birosag.hu/en/information/hungarian-judicial-system 
As a ‘little constitutional court’ one panel of the Curia delivers judgments in cases where a local 
government decree is challenged on the ground of violation of law or where a local government fails 
to create regulation. 
The Curia has no right to select the cases to be dealt with (a certiorari).2 That is why the number of 
the judges at the Curia is relatively high: currently more than 80 judges are working at this court. 
Many of the three-member panels are specialized to a given field of law (mostly within the civil law 
department). 
 
Figure 1: Organigram of the Hungarian court hierarchy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is worth mentioning here that the Curia has (besides publishing edited and unedited judgments) 
some specific means in order to guarantee the coherence of the judicial practice.3 First, unlike 
supreme courts in Western European countries the Curia can deliver decisions on the correct 
interpretation of the law that are binding for all courts (uniformity decisions). Second, departments 
of the Curia can issue “general opinions” which also revolve around questions of interpretation and 
application of the law. The specificity of both guiding tools is that they are not necessarily judgments 
delivered in a particular case. They reflect problems arising in the judicial practice in a mid-abstract 
level (in between the abstraction level of text of the law and that of the reasoning of a judicial 
decision). That is why their drafting style is somehow similar to those of the legislated law. 
 
                                                 
2The new civil procedural law (entering into force on 1 January 2018) narrows the scope of cases where the parties can 
turn to the Curia for extraordinary legal remedy. In order to mitigate this restriction the law authorizes the Curia to give 
permission to bring a case before the court if it has serious legal or social implications. 
3 The Venice Commission repeatedly expressed its concerns about the means guaranteed in the Hungarian legal system 
to ensure the uniformity of the jurisprudence. The Commission highlighted that “the uniformity procedure and its system 
of supervision by the court presidents might have a chilling effect on the independence of the individual judge (paragraph 
73) and that a uniformity procedure may only be acceptable if it does not have a negative influence on the career of the 
judges (paragraph 74).” See Venice Commission, Opinion on the Cardinal Acts on the Judiciary that were amended 
following the adoption of Opinion CDL-AD (2012)001 on Hungary. Strasbourg, 15 October 2012, 683/2012, CDL-AD 
(2012)020, paragraph 52. 
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Although the constitutional status of these “quasi-laws” is problematic, because judges who write 
them rather “make” than “apply” the law, these decisions are very popular amongst judges. They cite 
and apply them as if they were “hard law”. This is because general opinions by providing detailed 
guiding rules make the sometimes too abstractly drafted legislated law “consumable” for every-day 
use.4 
 
A drawback of this system of unification of judicial practice is that the published guiding decisions 
do not embrace all the relevant difficulties and uncertainties of the judicial practice. The Curia tends 
to deliver and publish guiding decisions in cases where they have to decide as a forum of legal 
remedy. Many difficult and widely present practical issues simply do not reach the Curia (there are 
only a restricted number of causes that entitle the losing party to bring the case before the Curia). The 
table below compiled in 2012 concerning criminal cases shows this situation: 
 
Table 1: Proportion of guiding decisions of the Curia in some types of criminal cases 
 
Examined 
period:1980-85, 1990-
95 and 2006-11 
Type of delict 
Murder (Curia 
ordinary forum 
of appeal) 
Theft (Curia 
only extra-
ordinary 
remedy forum) 
Fraud (Curia 
only extra-
ordinary remedy 
forum) 
Robbery (Curia 
only extra-
ordinary remedy 
forum) 
Proportion of decisions 
published by the Curia 
21,8% 13,0% 5,8% 7,4% 
Proportion of the given 
delict within all delicts 
committed in a year on 
average 
<0,1% 59,1% 8,20% 1,40% 
 
It may be that this weakness motivated the legislation when in 2012 it established the institution of 
the so-called ‘jurisprudence-analysis groups’ within the Curia to address the most controversial issues 
of the Hungarian judicial practice.5 These working groups typically consist of judges, law professors, 
other representatives of the legal profession, and at times other external experts as well. The subject-
matters are determined every year by the President of the Curia on the proposals of the departments 
of the Curia, but heads of the departments on lower courts, and other representatives of the legal 
profession and legal scholar may also make proposals to this agenda. The groups can analyze the 
practice of lower level courts and can identify and resolve (on a theoretical level) legal problems 
which not necessary reach the Curia in the ordinary way of appeal. In their published final report the 
groups can make recommendations in order to improve the quality of adjudication in a certain field. 
 
                                                 
4Zsolt Ződi: Citations of Previous Decisions, and the Quality of Judicial Reasoning, Acta Iuridica Hungarica, 56, No 1, 
pp. 129–148 (2015)  
5 Article 29 and 30 of the Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organization and Administration of Courts (hereinafter AOAC). 
The publication of the judicial decisions is a starting point of all efforts to reach legal unity. In this 
respect the situation in Hungary is quite controversial. We have to differentiate between three types 
of document (or decision-) groups, where accessibility and searchability is quite different. 
 
1. In the case of the first group of documents (cca. 50-60 documents per year), the overall 
situation is quite good. These documents are accessible for free, in the form of a searchable 
database on the website of the Curia. This group of documents comprises uniformity 
decisions6, departments’ general opinions7, reports of the jurisprudence analysis groups8, and 
some 10% of the edited (‘headnoted’) leading cases9.  
2. The second group of documents, the vast majority of the edited decisions (cca. 400 
document per year) are not accessible for free. The publication right (copyright) of these 
decisions had been transferred at the beginning of the ’90-s to a private publishing company10 
which is publishing these decisions in a journal called ‘Kúriai Döntések’ (Decisions of the 
Curia)11. The publisher has also the exclusive right of giving re-publishing rights to other 
publishing companies, including the most popular database publisher12.  
3. The third group of decisions are the un-edited (anonymized) decisions (some 10.000 
decisions per year). These documents are accessible in a searchable format on the website of 
the NOJ.13 Though there is a search engine on the site, there are ongoing complaints 
concerning the user friendliness of the site. No wonder that bigger database publishers are all 
offering paying services, where these documents are published with a user friendly search 
engine.  
 
Hungarian judiciary includes judges only, prosecution office is a separate branch of the justice 
system. Thus, prosecutors are recruited separately from judges and they have a different career line. 
Nonetheless, there is an opportunity for any legal practitioner (including prosecutors) to apply for 
judgeship as the Bar Exam in Hungary is exactly the same for every legal profession.14 
 
The following tables show the change of numbers of court staff in Hungary in the past few years. 
 
Table 2: Number of judges in Hungary (based on the information provided by the president of the 
NOJ) 
 Approved 
status 
Actual 
2011 2.937 2.889 
2012 2.897 2.782 
2013 3.024 2.914 
2014 2.929 2.839 
2015 2.932 2.840 
2016 2.937 2.846 
 
  
                                                 
6http://www.lb.hu/hu/jogegysegi-hatarozatok 
7http://www.lb.hu/hu/kollvel 
8http://www.lb.hu/hu/joggyakorlat-elemzo-csoportok-osszefoglaloi 
9http://www.lb.hu/hu/elvi-birosagi-hatarozatok; http://www.lb.hu/hu/elvi-birosagi-dontesek 
10HVG-ORAC, http://www.hvgorac.hu/ 
11http://hvgorac.hu/folyoiratok_csoport/kuriai_dontesek_kiadvany 
12Wolters Kluwer’s Jogtár product: https://uj.jogtar.hu/ 
13http://birosag.hu/ugyfelkapcsolati-portal/birosagi-hatarozatok-gyujtemenye 
14 The Bar Exam consists of one written exam (resolving a case which includes a legal problem), and three oral exams, 
one in each major branch of law. The oral exams are focused on the examinee’s knowledge about the substance of the 
laws and not on her legal skills and competences.  
 Table 3: Number of administrative employees in Hungary (based on the information provided by the 
president of the NOJ) 
 
Number of court clerks Approved Actual 
2011 614 605 
2012 794 736 
2013 793 783 
2014 817 798 
2015 861 833 
2016 887 851 
Number of judge trainees Approved Actual 
2011 359 256 
2012 359 239 
2013 359 239 
2014 359 260 
2015 283 237 
2016 254 218 
Number of other administrative court 
employees 
Approved Actual 
2011 6.902 6.786 
2012 7.016 6.920 
2013 7.091 6.963 
2014 7.261 7.167 
2015 7.298 7.141 
2016 7.326 7.189 
 
One can see that while the number of the judges and judge trainees has not changed significantly, 
there has been a remarkable increase in the number of clerks and administrative staff. 
 
Usually the first step to become a judge is to work as a judge trainee within the judicial system. 
Theoretically, every person who passed the Bar Exam can apply for judgeship, but (as we later discuss 
it) the figures show that the vast majority of successful applicants starts his/her judicial career as a 
judge trainee. Trainees cannot make decisions, they can prepare draft-resolutions, can give advice to 
court users who cannot hire a lawyer and they attend trials in order to learn the work of a judge. 
 
A judge trainee who has already passed the Bar Exam can be appointed to a court-clerk. Clerks can 
take decisions in cases of less importance (minor offences, some decisions in the company registration 
procedure etc.) under their own name. Besides, they can also prepare draft-resolutions and provide 
assistance for judges. In the Hungarian judicial system working as a clerk is generally considered as 
a necessary step before the application for judgeship. After a minimum one year of clerkship a person 
can apply for judgeship.15 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 According to the law, a person who passed the Bar Exam and after that has been working as lawyer for one year can 
also apply for judgeship. In spite of this possibility, the typical applicant comes from the judicial system.  
 Figure 2: Actual number of court staff 
 
 
 
 
The annual budget of the court system in 2017 is cca. 321 millions of euros which is 0,67 percent of 
the annual state budget. Though in the last few years there has been a slight increase in the amount 
of the budget of the court system (see at sub-section 2.5) budgetary support for Hungarian courts is 
rather low compared to the general European level. Expenditure on courts per inhabitant ranks 
Hungary merely at the 23th place among EU Member States.16 
 
1.2. Key functions in the administration of justice 
The model of judicial self-government in court management was introduced in Hungary when the 
National Judicial Council (Országos Igazságszolgáltatási Tanács) was set up in 1997 as the central 
organ of court administration. The council consisted of 15 members, of which two-thirds were judges: 
                                                 
16 Based on data acquired from EU Justice Scoreboard 2017. Its data from the year 2015. 
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9 were elected by the college of judicial delegates, and the President of the Supreme Court ex officio 
was at the same time the president of the NJC. The remaining one-third of the council were ‘external 
members’, representing other legal professions and the political branch. The NJC was for the first 
time clearly separated from the executive; the one single institutional link between the two branches 
was constituted by the Minister of Justice who was a member of the judicial council, but the minister 
had no genuine influence on the functioning of the justice system. As many members of the NJC were 
at the same time court presidents charged with important administrative tasks (at times even 7 from 
the 9 judges were court managers17), the operation of the NJC was influenced by strong corporate 
interest, so the council was not interested in the strict control over the performance of courts. Or as it 
was regularly stated, within this framework, members of the NJC who were court presidents at the 
same time were not interested in the appropriate control of the court leaders’ work.18 As a result, 
under the guise of independence, the judiciary lacked any meaningful democratic control, 
transparency and accountability.19 Consequently, the judicial branch had to face numerous difficulties 
which to a large extent stemmed from the failures of the central administration. 
 
In 2012 the National Judicial Council was disbanded, and since then the administrative government 
of the judiciary has exercised by the President of the National Office for the Judiciary (NOJ)20 
under the supervision of a new body called National Committee of Justices (NCJ).21 The president 
of the NOJ is elected by the Parliament by the two-third majority of the MPs for 9 years while the 
members of the NCJ are elected by the members of the judiciary. 
 
According to the relevant statute, the President of the NOJ carries out the functions of central 
administration of the courts. She is responsible for strategic planning of court administration and in 
some areas can adopt binding guidelines and ‘soft’ recommendation for the courts. One of her most 
important competences is to appoint and supervise the presidents of regional courts of appeal and 
regional courts.22 
 
The NCJ functions as the supervisory body over the activity of the President of the NOJ. In addition 
to its supervisory tasks, NCJ also takes part in the management of courts. The NCJ is composed of 
15 members. One of them is the President of the Curia ex officio, the other 14 judge members of the 
NCJ are elected in a secret ballot by majority vote at the meeting of the delegated judges. 
 
The most important rights and duties of the NCJ are:23 
- determining the principles to be applied by the President of the NOJ and the President of the 
Curia when they select the successful applicant for judgeship and in some cases the NCJ has 
the right to veto the appointment for judgeship of an applicant picked by the President of the 
NOJ or the President of the Curia (see details under subsection 2.2). 
                                                 
17http://ekint.org/lib/documents/1479373866-biroi_fuggetlenseg.pdf, 95. 
18Zoltán Fleck: Jogállam és Igazságszolgáltatás a változó világban [Rule of law and administration of justice in a changing 
world], Budapest, Pallas Páholy – Gondolat Kiadó, 2008, 175. 
19Zoltán Fleck, a leading Hungarian expert in the field of sociology of law wrote extensively on the fundamental failures 
and dysfunctions of judicial self-administration in Hungary between 1997 and 2011. See for example Zoltán Fleck: 
Bíróságok mérlegen. Igazságszolgáltatásunk újabb tíz éve. [Courts on Trial. 10 Years Passed], Budapest, Pallas, 2008. 
On the general problems of judicial self-administration in CEE countries through judicial councils see Michal Bobek & 
David Kosar, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe 15 
German Law Journal No. 7 (2014) 
20The President of the NOJ was a former court leader who has a close family tie with one of the prominent representatives 
of the governmental party. 
21 This name is from the translation of the AOAC. This organ, however, calls itself National Judicial Council in its English 
website (see http://birosag.hu/en/njc/national-judicial-council). In order to clearly distinguish it from the disbanded 
Országos Igazságszolgáltatási Tanács, we use the name above. 
22 For the full list of competences see Annex 
23 For the full list of the competences see Annex 
- exercising the right of consent regarding the appointment of court leaders who did not receive 
the approval of the competent judicial body, 
- deciding on the approval to the renew the appointments of presidents and deputy presidents of 
the regional courts of appeal, regional courts, administrative and labor courts and district courts 
if the president or the deputy president has already served two terms of office in the same 
position,24 
-  appointing the President and members of the service court. 
 
Nonetheless the ‘checks and balances’ power of NCJ provided by the law is weak as: 
- it does not have separate administration from the NOJ, preparatory works of the meetings is 
organized by the NOJ; 
- it does not have a strong president (the presidential position of the NCJ operates on a rotational 
basis; members shall rotate every 6 months); 
- the administrative superior of all members of the NCJ (with the exception of the president of 
the Curia) is the President of the NOJ; 
- it has the right to approval in some cases of court leaders’appointment, but it is not entitled to 
decide autonomously in crucial HR questions. 
 
According to the published memos, the vast majority of motions of the President of NOJ are approved 
by the NCJ. However, a recent article has leaked that there are bitter debates between some members 
of the NCJ and the President of the NOJ.25 
 
As for the quality of courts’ activity, a declaration published by the NCJ on the 23rd of March 2012 
emphasizes that its members “want to meet the requirements of the society represented by the 
legislative power.” They declared as follow: 
“We consider as an elemental [elementary] obligation – besides the protection of the judicial 
independence – to help the work of the National Office for the Judiciary with our proposals, 
observations, assuring the mutual interests of the efficient and timely jurisdiction.” 
 
The functioning of the new system has also been heavily criticized. The Venice Commission actively 
monitored the reform of the judiciary and the transformation of court administration. The 
Commission objected particularly to the lack of judicial self-government: the new model established 
a long term of office of the President of the NOJ with extremely wide competences, without 
meaningful control over her activities as it provided only a negligible role for the NCJ and lacked 
sufficient means for accountability. The Commission found the composition of the NCJ (it is 
composed of judges exclusively) problematic too, “with respect to its uniformity, which can easily 
lead to mere introspection and a lack of both public accountability and understanding of external 
needs and demands, especially those of the “users” of the judicial system (advocates, civil society) or 
representatives of the academia.”26 These criticisms were slightly addressed by the Hungarian 
legislator. 
 
Beside the NCJ and the President of the NOJ, there are some other players within the court system 
that can more or less influence – in a formal or informal way – the functioning of the administration 
of justice. 
 
                                                 
24 As a general rule, in order to prevent the excessive influence of a certain person on the administration of a given court, 
one person can be appointed to a court president only twice in a row. 
25 See Erika Pálmai: ’Közbenső ítélet’ [Interim judgment] HVG, 29/06/2017 pp. 16-18 
26 Venice Commission, Opinion on Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act CLXI 
of 2011 on the Organization and Administration of Courts of Hungary, Strasbourg, 19 March 2012, 663/2012, CDL-AD 
(2012)001 
The President of the Curia – apart from his membership in the NCJ – does not exercise 
administrative competencies over the court system.27 Nonetheless, the Curia has relative autonomy 
in its own court administration, therefore the President of the Curia provides for the personnel and 
material conditions for the operation of the Curia from the funding available. The President directs 
the financial and economic activities of the Curia, and exercises the employer’s rights conferred upon 
him by law. One of the most remarkable aspects of his autonomy is that he is entitled to hire the 
judicial and administrative staff without the consent of the President of the NOJ. 
 
The National Bar Association does not fulfil any function in the governance of the administration 
of justice. The Bar Exam is organized by the Ministry of Justice. The members of exam panels are 
selected from the experienced representatives of all legal professions. 
 
The State Audit Office of Hungary checks annually the fiscal management of the court system and 
decides on whether the accounts of the courts are true and fair. 
 
Outside the organs described above there is no other body which plays a role in the functioning of the 
judicial system in Hungary. Nonetheless, judges have some non-governmental organizations. The 
most significant is the Association of Hungarian Judges. Its main goal is to represent and enforce 
the interest of the judiciary. Besides, its Charter declares as a goal to “improve the quality of 
adjudication” and it has an ethical committee which issues ethical statements in the field of judicial 
behavior in particular cases (without names). It is worth mentioning that female judges and lay 
assessors28 also have their associations. The latter one is the only one amongst all judicial 
organizations that criticizes the current state of affairs in the Hungarian judicial system.29 
 
Beside the central judicial administration, two kinds of local self-governing bodies exist in each 
regional court, each regional court of appeal and in the Curia. The plenary session of judges consists 
of all judges who work at the given court, while the member of the Local Judicial Council is elected 
by the plenary session of judges. Both organs have some competences in providing opinions and have 
the right to initiate inspection against local court leaders. In addition, the Local Judicial Council plays 
an influential role in the process of judicial recruitment (see below). 
 
1.3. Current issues in the administration of justice 
As for the current issues, there is an "evergreen" problem, namely the timeliness of the administration 
of justice and the case-backlog accumulated before 2012. A similar problem is that there have been 
regions in the country (Budapest and the Central Region of Hungary) which have been tackling a 
disproportionally high workload. The situation was worsened in 2012 when the relevant law 
                                                 
27 Before 2012, the President of the Supreme Court was also the president of the NJC. The two competences (judicial and 
administrative) were separated as a result of the 2011 judicial reform, and this change provided one of the reasons for the 
government to terminate the mandate of the then President of the Supreme Court three and a half years before the end of 
his term of office. Later, the European Court of Human Rights found that the removal of the President from his office 
violated his right to freedom of expression as his mandate was terminated after his publicly expressed criticism of 
legislative reforms related to the judiciary. See Case of Baka v. Hungary, no. 20261/12, Grand Chamber, 23 June 2016 
28 In Hungary lay participation in adjudication is realized through lay assessors who are elected by the general assembly 
of local governments. Lay assessors are not part of the court staff. Before trial courts in cases of greater significance they 
adjudicate together with a professional judge as a panel. According to the law, in the trial process they generally have the 
same rights and duties as the professional judge. Nonetheless, as sociological studies clearly show it, their impact on the 
outcome of the procedure is almost zero. See Mátyás Bencze, Attila Badó, Reforming the Hungarian Lay Justice System. 
In: Cserne Péter, H Szilágyi István, Könczöl Miklós, Paksy Máté, Takács Péter, Tattay Szilárd (eds.), Theatrum Legale 
Mundi: symbola Cs. Varga oblata. Budapest:Szent István Társulat,2007.pp. 1-13. 
29 See ulnokok.hu (available only in Hungarian) 
suddenly lowered the retirement age for judges from 70 to 62 years and therefore forced to retire 
almost 300 senior judges (around 10% of the total number of judges).30 
 
The NOJ concentrates its effort on reducing the backlog and the time which is required to finish a 
case as well as leveling the workload amongst courts. In the past few years the NOJ initiated some 
amendments to the law in force and organizational changes aiming at speeding up the court procedure. 
As many figures shows this effort has proven to be successful. What is a challenge here is to reconcile 
the efficiency of the court system with the fair trial requirement and access to justice. 
 
There is also too much administrative burden on judges that induce a permanent need to increase 
the number of the competent assistance personnel. There would be a demand from the side of judges 
to employ legal consultants who could prepare the case for trial (including the collection of the 
relevant case law, academic publications, foreign legal solutions etc.). 
 
A further challenge is the devaluation of the judicial (and other court employees’) salary. In the past 
10 years their salary lost 30-40 percent of its purchasing power. It is no coincidence that in the 2012 
CEPEJ rating the Hungarian gross judicial average salary remains the second lowest among EU 
Member States.31Although a three-staged pay raise has begun from 2016 (5 percent raise in each 
stage), the threat has remained present that brightest law students choose job options other than 
judicial career. 
 
Departing from the “internal issues” there are some “external” demands towards the courts. Decisions 
taken in sensitive cases (politically-laden or celebrities’ cases) attract the attention of the public, and 
after a decision taken in these kinds of cases heated public debates usually start about the impartiality 
and professional competence of judges. That is why the leadership of the Curia and the other courts 
as well as the NOJ dedicate extraordinary energy to explain the important court decisions in an 
understandable language through their website and the media. The goal of enhancing public trust in 
courts also dominates the communication of the NOJ for this reason. 
 
2. Classical judicial evaluation arrangements 
2.1. Introduction 
One of the strategic purposes of the President of the NOJ is to guarantee timely and high-quality 
justice. As the excellence of the judges is considered as a crucial factor in the quality of justice, the 
legislature and the President of the NOJ have regulated the recruitment and evaluation procedure for 
judges and judge-trainees in a very detailed manner in the past few years. They mostly concentrated 
on the objectiveness of the selection and evaluation process as the appointment system has been 
criticized for a long time because it made the arbitrary selection possible. 
 
As for the quality of judicial work, the predominant conception in Hungary is that only the peers 
(judges) are competent to decide on the quality of the work of a judge, a judge-trainee or on the 
eligibility of a judge-candidate. That is why the evaluation and recruitment procedure focuses on the 
‘internal (professional) values’ of the judicial activity while the perspective of court users remains 
almost unreflected and the system is not sensitive enough to the needs and opinions of the members 
of the society. 
 
                                                 
30The CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court later declared that this legislation had been a violation of EU law 
and the Fundamental Law. After that, however, in practice most of the judges remained in retirement and those who came 
back were not reinstated to their court leader positions. See 
http://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/14_Bencze_Matyas_Bado_Attila.pdf 
31 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2014/Rapport_2014_en.pdf 
2.2. Recruitment and initial evaluation of judges 
2.2.1. Selection bodies 
In case of application for a position of a judge, the Local Judicial Council of the affected regional 
court32 interviews the applicant and ranks her/him on the basis of the result of the interview and of 
some aspects provided by the relevant law. Members of the Local Judicial Council are exclusively 
judges from the court which is affected by the vacant position, and they have the biggest impact on 
the outcome of the selection procedure. In case of applications to a higher judicial position (regional 
court, regional court of appeal and Curia) it is compulsory to get and to take into consideration the 
opinion of the competent department (civil law, criminal law or administrative and labor law) of 
the affected court on the applicants. 
 
Nonetheless there is a professional aptitude test carried out by a body of forensic experts(one general 
practitioner, one psychiatrist and one psychologist) designated by the minister in charge of the judicial 
administration, in agreement with the President of the NOJ.  
 
The president of the affected court on the basis of his/her own considerations may deviate from the 
ranking of the Local Judicial Council, and may recommend the appointment of the second or third 
placed applicant (in this case reasons of re-ranking shall be given in writing). Besides, in the last 
phase of the selection procedure the President of the NOJ may also deviate from the ranking of the 
Local Judicial Council on the basis of the guidelines adopted by the NCJ,33 and may recommend the 
appointment of the second or third placed applicant. In this case, the NCJ has to approve the deviation. 
 
2.2.2. Selection process 
Application for the position of a judge is open to any jurist who passed the Bar Exam and meets some 
criteria listed in the relevant law (such as no criminal record, at least 30 years of age, Hungarian 
citizenship, at least one year work experience after the Bar Exam etc.). 
 
Therefore, the selection procedure is uniform for any applicants regardless of their professional 
background. Nonetheless, according to the relevant law, in the evaluation of the previous job 
experience the assessment aspects are different for internal and external applicants. In addition during 
the interview the different professional background also can be taken into consideration. 
 
There is no written or oral examination on legal expertise for prospective judges. After the deadline 
for applications expires, the Local Judicial Council of the court where there is a vacancy interviews 
the applicants and, based on the findings of the interview and some other statutory criteria34 listed 
below it determines the ranking of applicants. The minister in charge of the judicial system issued the 
number of points to be awarded for each of the criterion. The higher the points awarded the higher 
the rank of the applicant. There is also a recommendation issued by the NCJ (1/2012. (X. 15.) OBT) 
which interprets the activities that are assessed and scored by the Local Judicial Council. The list of 
criteria are as follow: 
- result of the job evaluation made on the applicant’s previous activity within the 
administration of justice (such as judge trainee, court clerk etc.); 
- the previous employer’s assessment for applicants with no judiciary background; 
- duration of practical experience or service time after passing the Bar Exam; 
- the opinion of the competent department of the affected court (in case of applications to a 
                                                 
32 Or the affected regional court of appeal, or the Curia if the position is vacant in those courts. 
33 The president of the NOJ may deviate, for example, if the second or third placed applicant has more work experience 
that may guarantee the more efficient reduction of the case backlog in an overburdened court. Nonetheless, the guidelines 
emphasize the possibility of the ’free choice’ of the president. 
(http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/obt_dokumentumok/3_2013.pdf) 
34Par. 4 of Section 14 of Act CLXII of 2011.  
higher judicial position); 
- result of the professional aptitude test; 
- result of the Bar Exam; 
- the academic degree; 
- any certificate to practice law in a specific jurisdiction or other secondary certificate (for 
a specific field of discipline); 
- any study trip abroad made in a specific field of discipline after receiving the law degree; 
- language skills; 
- any publication relating to legal issues; 
- grade in compulsory education arranged for practicing law in a specific jurisdiction for 
which a Bar Exam is required, and participation in facultative trainings; 
- any extra-curricular activities that may be taken into consideration for judgeship; 
- the findings of the interview by the Local Judicial Council (this is generally considered as 
a subjective criterion); 
- the opinion of the president of the district court or administrative and labor court where 
the post is available. 
 
In the case of applicants for a higher judicial office, the first and third criteria of the list shall be given 
priority in the process of evaluation (this is because of the assumption that those persons can be 
eligible for filling higher judicial position who have previous judicial work experience). Otherwise, 
there are no priority criteria, the number of points is decisive in the ranking. Where several applicants 
have the same number of points, their ranking shall be decided based on the conclusions made by the 
Local Judicial Council following the interview. If the applicants are given the same scores after being 
interviewed by the judicial council, their ranking shall be decided by a reasoned decision of the 
judicial council adopted by simple majority, in writing. 
There is a possibility for both the court president and the president of the NOJ to deviate from the 
ranking established by the Local Judicial Council, and may recommend the appointment of the second 
or third placed applicant. In that case she shall give reason for the decision. If the president of the 
NOJ deviates from the ranking she need to obtain the consent of NCJ. 
 
Table 4: Proportion of approved deviations from the original ranking 
 
Year 
Total number of 
appointments 
Number of 
deviations from 
the original 
ranking 
Number of 
deviations 
approved by the 
NCJ 
Number of 
deviations 
disapproved by 
the NCJ 
2014 105 14 14 0 
2015 99 5 2 3 
2016 94 6 6 0 
 
A recent development has been that the government redesigned the recruitment system for 
administrative judges: previous professional experience in the public administration is rewarded with 
extra points in the judicial application process while the points awarded by Local Judicial Councils 
are halved. That means a huge advantage for candidates coming from the public administration. 
Critics, accusing the government with a ‘Polish-style court packing’ (to which the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court fell victim after 2012), point to a threatening consequence of the new regime: 
Through this reform the government can fill the vacant administrative judicial positions with ex-
governmental officers who are loyal to the political orientation of the government currently in office. 
The relevance of the criticism is supported by a fact following from a reform of the court procedure 
in administrative review cases: from 1 January 2018, administrative courts need to hire approximately 
200 new judges.35 
 
For candidates, it is compulsory to undergo a professional aptitude test which include medical and 
physical examination, as well as psychological assessment. The examinations shall cover all mental 
and health considerations that may preclude or severely impair the judge’s performance,36 and shall 
assess the judge’s intelligence and personality. The test shall provide an assessment of the candidate’s 
personality from the perspective of his/her suitability for being a judge. The list of faculties to be 
tested as follow:  
1. decision-making ability, 
2. ability to cooperate, 
3. analytical thinking, 
4. foresight, 
5. discipline, 
6. responsibility, 
7. determination, 
8. careful attention,  
9. integrity, 
10. communication skills, 
11. conflict-solving skills, 
12. creativity, 
13. self-assurance, confidence, 
14. independence, 
15. problem analysis and observation skills, 
16. problem solving skills, 
17. ability to use professional knowledge in practice, 
18. organization and planning skills, 
19. communication skills verbally and in writing, 
20. objectivity. 
 
However, according to the ministerial decree which provides the detailed rules of the test only an 
exploring conversation (exploratio), and Rorschach, MMPI as well as RAVEN tests are compulsory 
to conduct. If necessary some complementing tests may be added such as MAWI (IQ test), Szondi 
and CPI. It is not clear how these basic examinations can assess properly the faculties above. There 
is no dispute on the reliability and usefulness of the applied psychological tests. An author, however, 
says that this psychological test was a simple reception of the aptitude test applied to navy seal 
candidates in the USA. The reason for that was that lawmakers did not find an adequate model for 
assessing judicial faculties at the time of the birth of this decree.37 
 
Nonetheless, during the interview some of the abovementioned faculties can be evaluated. Besides, 
the job evaluation made on the applicant’s previous activity may contain some hints that can be 
                                                 
35https://444.hu/2017/11/15/eddig-nem-engedtek-be-a-kormany-embereit-az-igazsagszolgaltatasba-de-most-felretoltak-
az-utbol-az-akadekoskodo-birakat 
36There is no regulation or professional protocol in order to determine the physical disabilities which prevent judge 
candidates from conducting judicial activity. Nonetheless, according to a competent court leader, there is a consensus 
amongst medical experts that challenges in movement are not such disabilities. However complete deafness and blindness 
prevent the candidates performing a court hearing that is why such persons are not eligible for judgeship. It must be 
emphasized that in lack of official regulation, the standpoint above is the mere opinion of medical experts. In Hungary 
there has not yet been assessed a candidate judge with complete blindness of deafness. 
37Hack, Péter, Bevezetés, In: Hack Péter, Garai Borbála (eds.), Az igazságszolgáltatási rendszerek átláthatósága: A 
Transparency International 2007. évi korrupciós világjelentésének magyar változata. [Transparency of Administration of 
Justices] Transparency International Magyarország, Budapest,2008.p. 18. 
informative on legal competence, treatment of parties, capacity to work efficiency and capacity to 
work in team. These are important sources of information as the vast majority (with insignificant 
exceptions) of newly appointed judges come from the pool of court clerks who previously worked as 
judge trainees for years (at least three years). During the training period, the trainee has the 
opportunity to observe the practical judicial work, and can gain the adequate professional 
knowledge with conscious and systematic preparation for the Bar Exam. Judge-trainees are 
continuously evaluated by their instructor judges, and the members of the Local Judicial Council who 
determine the ranking of applicants are aware of the result of this evaluation. 
 
A very recent development was that in 2016 the rules of the selection procedure for judge trainees 
were redesigned in order to be reasonably meritocratic (previously a permanent criticism headed 
toward judicial administration because the selection process was prone to nepotism).38 The reform is 
of utmost importance because of the very high proportion of successful candidates come from 
within the judicial system. That is why it is worth-while to summarize the rules of the selection 
process of judge-trainees. 
 
The aim of the reform of the judge trainee selection was to measure the essential qualities to serve as 
a judge in the future (competence-based test). In the exam skills of communication, the technique 
of legal writing and general knowledge of the candidate are equally examined. That means that skills 
of application of substantive and procedural legal rules plays an important part of the admission test, 
but logical abilities, technique of legal writing, the ability to determine what is essential, empathic 
capability and creative thinking are also examined. The underlying assumption behind the creation 
of this system was that the best way of maintaining, even increasing the quality of adjudication is the 
recruitment of judge trainees who already have the necessary capabilities to become a judge. Their 
competence can further be developed in the time of the internship. That is why verbal expression as 
well as capability of managing conflicts and acting decisively are assessed during the admission test. 
 
First the applicant must submit an application (according to the actual application standards within 
deadline) with a letter of motivation and with all necessary attachments such as certificate of negative 
criminal record and a curriculum vitae. The application form allows setting a list of preferences 
amongst the vacant judge trainee positions. The applicant must pass a centrally organized written and 
an oral competition exam at the Hungarian Academy of Justice (Magyar Igazságügyi Akadémia) 
which is, otherwise, the center of professional training for judges under the supervision of the 
President of the NOJ in Budapest. 
 
Test questions are determined on a yearly basis and the exams evaluated by the Entrance Exam and 
Internal Competition Committee appointed by the President of the NOJ. It can be 120 points to score 
maximum in the exam. In the written part of exam, the general and legal knowledge, basic legal 
institutions and procedural models are in focus, and sometimes, even detailed legal provisions are 
asked (that means that candidates have to know the text of important laws by heart). All applicants 
do the test in an anonymous way with a personal code number assigned to them. In the oral part of 
the exam the applicant talks about his/her motives, professional background then she must solve a 
fictive legal case, a personal situation and a workplace affair before a three-member panel. 
 
The applicant can get 30 extra points, which are allocated to the qualification of the law degree 
(summa cum laude, cum laude), study trip abroad, distinguished rank in national student research 
competition and foreign language skills. If the application is unsuccessful, the applicant is put on the 
                                                 
38 The president of the court of appeal could decide alone and without binding guidelines on hiring someone to a judge-
trainee position. Under these circumstances children, other relatives and friends of judges of the affected court enjoyed a 
huge advantage in the recruitment process. See Badó, Attila, Bóka, János, Európa kapujában [In the Gate of Europe], 
Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 2002, pp. 159-160  
waiting list so she can apply for the position of a trainee judge within a year after the exam. In this 
case she can request a revaluation of his/her application on the basis ofthe results of the passed exam. 
Applicants are ranked by their points and the president of the affected court can choose from them on 
a discretionary basis and hear them personally. But there is a limit to this discretion: if there are 
applicants who obtained more than 90% of the maximum points (that is more than 135 points), the 
president must not choose an applicant with lower points. This means that the new system is more 
objective, because previously the scores of the applicants were not decisive: the president could 
choose anyone according to his/her subjective consideration. The very purpose of the introduction of 
the new system is to ensure the professional excellence of the hired applicant. Subjective 
considerations currently can play a role in the oral part of the exam and the personal hearing, where 
the evaluation of empathic capability and creative thinking can depend on personal impressions. 
 
As we were informed there is another way to be court employee with law degree. Court presidents 
can employ administrative staff members without conducting the above-mentioned application and 
selection process. It is not prohibited to hire a person for this job with law degree. That person works 
within the system and can take the Bar Exam like the judge-trainees. After the Bar Exam she is 
eligible to be appointed to court-clerk and after one year she can apply for the position of a judge. So, 
there is a loophole in the system by which the objective and transparent Entrance Exam can be 
skipped. 
 
2.2.3. Selected candidates 
Though according to the relevant law, the application is open for any qualified person, the 2013 
figures show that applicants come mostly from within the court system (the total number of 
applicants was 588 out of which 497 were court employee). After 2015, there are no data available 
concerning the proportion of external and internal applicants, however, demographic composition of 
newly appointed judges is published. These figures show that the overwhelming majority of 
successful candidates was court clerk previously. We have no reason to assume that the proportion 
of external and internal applicants has changed in the last two years (Table 5). This raises again the 
issue of the opportunity to skip the Entrance Exam because, considering the overwhelming majority 
of successful internal applicants, it weakens the effectiveness of the judge trainee selection reform. 
Though we do not have exact data on the proportion of court administrators with law degree it is a 
telling figure that while from 2015 to 2016 the number of judge trainees decreased by 19 persons, the 
number of court administrators with higher education degree increased by 20 persons.39 
  
                                                 
39 See Table 2 and the annual report of the President of the NOJ from 2015 and 2016 (http://birosag.hu/obh/elnoki-
beszamolok/feleves-eves-beszamolok?tid=All). It must be emphasized that we do not know whether all (or any) of the 
newly hired court administrators have a law degree or not.  
 Table 5: Proportion of successful external/internal candidates 
 
Year 
Total number of 
applicants 
Number of newly 
appointed judges 
Number of 
successful 
“internal” 
candidates 
Number of 
successful 
“external” 
candidates 
2013 588 43 40 3 
2014 508 67 66 1 
2015 554 57 56 1 
2016 559 59 59 0 
 
As far as we know gender balance and minority representation is not a point of interest in the 
selection process either in the selection of judges or judge-trainees. Nonetheless, 69 percent of all 
judges are female. It may be because the working time of judges are more calculable than that of the 
advocates and thus being a judge can be more attractive for women who have to take care of children, 
household, and they can also be satisfied with lower salary (see below).40 It is worth mentioning that 
in the upper levels of the hierarchy the proportion of genders changes significantly. The data below 
are from 2012. Since then there have been no data broken down by court levels. The aggregated 
gender data, however, have not changed significantly since 2012. 
 
Table 6: Proportion of female and male judges (information provided by the president of the NOJ) 
 
Court levels/gender proportion Female judges Male judges 
District courts  71,7% 28,3% 
Administrative and labor courts 72% 28% 
Regional courts 66,9% 33,1% 
Regional courts of appeal 61,9% 38,1% 
Curia 50,6% 49,4% 
 
 
As the prestige and the salary of a judge increases more significantly with positions of higher 
courtsit may be not risky to say that these numbers suggest that a weak ‘glass-ceiling’ effect is 
present in the Hungarian judiciary. Besides, it is a problem for court leaders to re-allocate the work 
of many female judges who are absent longer time because of parental leave or caring a sick child. 
The lack of proper handling of this kind of absence may have a detrimental effect on the efficiency 
of the judicial system.  
 
As far as we know there is no policy in the judicial administration on guaranteeing any kind of 
minority representation and there is no debate about that either. It is worth noting that the proportion 
of the biggest ethnic minority (Romanies) is only a little more than 3 percent in the whole 
population.41 
 
2.2.4. Training and internship of apprentice judges 
There is a practice-oriented compulsory training for court clerks and apprentice judges organized 
by the Hungarian Academy of Justice at national level. Each takes five days (40 hours). Courses given 
to clerks and junior judges focus on general knowledge and abilities a judge needs, such as ethics, 
proper judicial behavior, managing court hearings, judicial writing etc. There are no exams at the end 
of the courses. 
                                                 
40 See fn. 19 p. 144-145 
41 http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak_nemzetiseg 
 Training courses do not differ by the professional background of the newly appointed judges. The 
only difference between judges with and without previous work experience within the court system 
is that the latter ones have to take part in courses focusing on administrative aspects (mostly case 
management) of the judicial work. The lack of customized trainings is, however, not a fatal problem 
considering the very homogenous professional experience of apprentice judges (see above). 
 
Furthermore, each apprentice judge has an “instructor” judge (just like judge trainees have) who 
supervises her/his work. The apprentice judge can consult with her, the instructor may attend the 
hearings held by the apprentice judge, she reads through the decisions of the judge and gives her 
advices. The instructors shall respect the judicial independence of the supervised judge. The period 
of supervision takes at least one year and it can be prolonged if it is necessary. The supervising activity 
ends with a report on the supervised judge made by the supervisor. 
 
Apprentice judges learn judicial writing during the compulsory training (one day, 8 hours). This 
training aims at improving their writing skills. Judge trainees and court clerks also have trainings 
courses focusing on judicial writing. Moreover, a judge trainee (and court clerk) is preparing 4-500 
draft decisions for their instructor judge by the time she is appointed judge. 
 
As the subjects (the main branches of the Hungarian legal system such as civil law, criminal law, 
administrative law etc.) of the Bar Exam in Hungary are uniform for all lawyers, many judges (almost 
half of them) have obtained a postgraduate diploma in the legal field she intended to specialize. 
These postgraduate courses are offered and organised by law schools and take one or two years.  
 
2.3. Continuous evaluation of judges 
2.3.1. Evaluation bodies 
Pursuant to the statute in effect, as a general rule, judges are assessed firstly in the third and secondly 
in the sixth years from their appointment and after that in every eighth year.42 The first evaluation is 
of great importance because junior judges are appointed for a determined three years “probationary” 
period. If a judge proves to be incompetent at the first evaluation her judgeship ceased 
automatically.43Apart from this regular inspection, an extraordinary evaluation can be carried out in 
specific situations/circumstances (signs of professional incompetence, skipping compulsory 
trainings, more than two years undue delay in a tried case and if the judge herself asks for it for some 
reason). 
During both types of assessment (regular and extraordinary), the head of the affected department 
(or other experienced judge appointed by her) assesses the quality of the judge’s work including the 
observation of substantive and procedural laws and case managerial regulations. Her trial conduct 
practice is also evaluated.  
 
2.3.2. Evaluation process 
This subsection also contains an issue which should be originally discussed under subtitle “Focus on 
the evaluation of judgements and legal writings”. This is so because in the process of the evaluation 
these issues are intertwined. 
 
                                                 
42 For specific provisions see Sections 71 to 77 of the Act CLXII of 2011 on the Status of the Judiciary  
43 This regulation can be criticized on the ground that the temporary nature of the first appointment maximizes the pressure 
on the judge to align with the judicial practice of the closest court of appeal. As the judges of the courts of appeal (generally 
regional courts) evaluate the junior judge, she can achieve a permanent post if she meet the expectations of the upper 
court judges. This situation may discourage the independent judicial thinking and thus may threat the personal 
independence of the judge. See also the opinion of the Venice Commission: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2007)028-e 
An order of the President of the NOJ contains a very detailed list on the assessment criteria (NOJ 
No 8 of 2015) for both types of assessment. The assessment has three aspects: a quantitative and a 
qualitative aspect of the judicial work as well as the evaluation of judicial skills. They are as follow: 
 
Table 7: Aspects of judicial evaluation 
 
Quantitative  
(based on data from the last 
year before the assessment) 
Qualitative Judicial skills 
Number of trial days  Preparation for the trial Focused thinking 
Number of trials  Trial conduct Ability to make decisions 
Number of finished cases 
Evidencing, practice of 
postponing trials 
Thoroughness 
Effectiveness of time 
management of trial days 
Judicial writing 
Handling with parties in a proper 
manner 
 Legal competence Organizational skills 
 
Administrative 
competence 
Working capacity 
 
Complying with 
deadlines 
Quality of verbal and written 
communication 
 
As for the quantitative evaluation, the activity of the judges is assessed in a statement based on 
caseload and activity-related data as well as second instance and review decisions, which shall be 
taken into consideration during the overall assessment. 
 
The qualitative part of the evaluation and checking the ‘judicial skills’ are conducted by the same 
methods. A certain number of judgments (that became final in the first instance) rendered by the 
judge are examined. Furthermore, ‘panel justice notes’ prepared in the examined period are 
considered during the assessment. . (Justice panel notes are memos made by the chief justices of the 
appellate panels when reviewing appeals. Regarding to quality-check it is useful because they contain 
remarks on writing and argumentative style of the judge which are typically not mentioned in 
appellate judgments.) 
 
As part of the qualitative assessment, the persuasive force of the oral and written justifications 
provided by the assessed judge has to be evaluated as well. The opinion of the head of the 
department competent in the legal area (if that person is different from the person conducting the 
examination) is also taken into consideration. The assessor judge shall examine the files of cases in 
which parties submitted complaint for undue delays or other reasons. According to the relevant law 
and regulation the proportion of the quashed/changed judgments of the assessed judge is not a 
quality indicator, but in practice it may have an impact on the outcome of the evaluation. The number 
of successful compensation claims against the judge for faulty professional activity does not play a 
role in the evaluation either (partly because this number is very low).44 As a uniform and compulsory 
writing manual for judges has not yet been adopted in Hungary (see details under subsection 3.3) its 
observation cannot be taken into consideration in the evaluating process. 
 
The assessed judge has the opportunity to comment on the report made by the assessor judge. The 
result of the evaluation can be the following: incompetent, competent, highly competent, and highly 
                                                 
44 In 2016 only about 10 judgments were delivered at the national level in which the court declared faulty judicial activity. 
(http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/obh/elnoki-beszamolok/elnoki_beszamolo_2016_online.pdf) 
competent for a higher judicial position (between 2012 and 2016 four judges proved to be 
‘incompetent’, their incompetence was revealed in their first assessment). If the assessed judge finds 
the result unfair, she has the right to seek legal remedy before the service court.45 
 
The result of the evaluation does not affect the salary of the assessed judge, however, if she applies 
for higher judicial position, the result is taken into consideration in the promotion process. It would 
be also useful if the system of the compulsory trainings and the evaluation mechanism were connected 
(e.g. the assessor would point to judicial skills of the assessed judges that should be improved by 
trainings). 
 
As one might notice, the judge’s professional activity is assessed by her immediate professional 
superior who knows her personally as well as on whom their professional career is decisively 
dependent. This situation raises the problem that apart from the detailed assessment criteria the 
assessor’s personal opinion on the examined judge may play a role in the assessment. Therefore, 
judges of lower courts are generally encouraged to align their judicial activity predominantly to the 
viewpoint of the reviewing second instance panel as well as to its judicial style, regardless of her 
opposing professional convictions. This situation affects judicial independence even if the reasonable 
uniformity of the practice of lower courts is also desirable. 
 
This assessment method may just as easily lead to the fragmentation of judicial practice including 
the quality of judicial opinions. Since only very few cases at district court level are reviewed by the 
Curia, the direction of legal practice conducted in the majority of cases is preponderantly determined 
by the legal thinking of the specific judges working at courts of second instance (regional courts). 
The assessor and the assessed judge are from the same county, judges from other counties are never 
involved in the assessing process; therefore, the judicial qualification mechanism may promote 
divergence of court of law practice by counties. This is especially true for questions of judicial activity 
that are typically not subject to review by the Curia (e.g. trial conduct and reasoning style, evidence 
practice or even sentencing).46 
 
2.3.3. Consequences of judicial evaluation on the appointment to managerial positions 
Although regular evaluation of judges has some components from which one can draw conclusions 
on the managerial skills of the judge (the report has to reflect the administrative and managerial 
activity, organizational skills of the judge, and her handling with parties and working capacity), it is 
designed fundamentally to check the judicial skills and competencies and not the managerial ones. 
In the Hungarian judicial system, there are basically two kinds of court leaders: professional and 
administrative. Chairs of judicial panels in appellate courts belong to the former group (they are 
leaders of their panels in a professional sense without administrative competences) while all the other 
court leaders exercise administrative competences. Within the latter group there are leaders who are 
responsible primarily for the professional quality of adjudication. They are the heads of departments 
(civil law, criminal law, and administrative and labor law) and leaders of groups (groups are also 
organized by the major fields of law at some district courts). The other type of administrative leaders 
is court presidents and deputy presidents who take primarily the task of running the court 
organization they preside (managerial and administrative issues). 
 
                                                 
45 The service court is a judicial body that consists of judges appointed by the NCJ. The service court decides on 
disciplinary proceedings against judges and disputes arising from the evaluation of the judicial work. The service court is 
organized centrally at national level. (http://birosag.hu/en/njc/service-court) 
46 For the latter see Badó, Attila, Bencze, Mátyás: Területi eltérések a büntetéskiszabási gyakorlat szigorúságát illetően 
Magyarországon 2003 és 2005 között. [Disparity in sentencing in Hungary between 2003 and 2005] In: Fleck, Zoltán 
(ed.): Igazságszolgáltatás a tudomány tükrében. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, (ELTE Jogi Kari Tudomány 6.) 2010. p 125-147. 
It is also a good indicator of the seriousness of the jurisprudential differences that the President of the Curia in 2016 set 
up a working group in order to analyze the disparity in sentencing and to elaborate some kind of ‘sentencing guidelines’. 
All court leaders in the judiciary must be a judge (with the exception of the deputy president of the 
NOJ who can be other court employee). There are no professional managers amongst court leaders, 
but managerial trainings are organized for court leaders at the Hungarian Academy of Justice. 
Trainings for leaders on management competences are prioritized within the annual training plan of 
the judiciary. 
 
According to the relevant statute, higher court leaders are appointed by the President of the NOJ or 
the President of the Curia, while the presidents of the regional courts of appeal and presidents of 
regional courts appoint lower court leaders. If the appointing person is other than the president of 
the court affected by the appointment, a recommendation from the president of the court where the 
appointment is made has to be obtained. 
 
As a general rule the positions of court leader are filled by way of an application procedure. A project 
proposal attached to the application has to contain the applicant’s long-term plans concerning the 
operation of the court, the department or group (only in case of applications to positions of 
department/group leader), as applicable, covering also the timetable for the implementation of such 
plans. The competent judicial body (hereinafter: opinionating body) of the court (most frequently the 
plenary session of judges of the affected court or the members of the affected department) where the 
applicant intended to be a court leader shall express its opinion on the applicants by way of secret 
ballot. The opinionating body shall present its recommendation in the sequence of the result of the 
vote. 
 
The appointing person conducts an interview with the applicants. She makes her decision taking into 
consideration the recommendation of the opinionating body. The appointing person is not bound by 
the recommendation of the opinionating body, however, if the decision is contradictory to the 
recommendation the reasons must be detailed in writing. In case that the president of the NOJ or the 
President of the Curia intends to appoint an applicant who was not supported by the majority of the 
assessment body, they have to obtain the prior opinion of the NCJ on the applicant. The applicant in 
question may be appointed if the NCJ gives its consent. 
 
As it can be seen, in the selection of court leaders the possibility of the enforcement of both the 
professional and the democratic aspects are guaranteed by the law. We did not find detailed 
regulations on substantive criteria which must be considered in the process of appointing judges to 
managerial positions. Presumably, the appointing person knows the applicants personally and/or she 
can be informed of her skills from the letter attached to the application and from the result of the 
ballot of the competent judicial body. In case the applicant has been a court leader prior to the 
application, the quality of her managerial work is taken into consideration. The applicant’s 
compatibility with the strategic goals of the NOJ is also a factor in her evaluation. 
 
In the absence of detailed criteria, the selection mechanism can be flexible enough, but at the same 
time subjective factors (personal sympathy/antipathy of the appointing person towards the applicant) 
may also influence the application process. The rules of the selection procedure are clear and detailed, 
but the substantive part of the selection i.e. the principles, criteria which guide the decision are not 
transparent. Nonetheless, figures from 2012 show that in 29 percent of the calls more than one 
applicants applied. This suggests that there is a real competition for leadership positions and the 
application process is not pre-arranged. It is also interesting but not necessarily a positive 
phenomenon that a great proportion of application procedures were declared unsuccessful (in 2015 
almost 20%, in 2016 36%of all calls).47 
                                                 
47Annual report of the president of the NOJ from 2015 and 2016. For the internal criticism of this practice see 
https://444.hu/2017/10/16/elvileg-johet-hando-tundenel-is-rosszabb-vezeto-de-ezt-belulrol-most-nehez-elkepzelni 
andhttp://index.hu/belfold/2017/10/05/az_a_biro_esett_handonak_akit_korabban_o_tuntetett_ki/ 
 There is no legal obligation to guarantee the gender balance amongst court leaders. However, 
Hungary, as we mentioned above, is a special case as 70 percent of the judges are female. 
Nonetheless, the higher the rank of the court leaders the bigger the proportion of the males: 
 
Table 8. Number of female and male court leaders 
 
 
Female 
president 
Male 
president 
Female 
deputy 
president 
Male deputy 
president 
Total 
number 
(female) 
Total 
number 
(male) 
Regional courts of appeal 1 4 3 2 4 6 
Regional courts 12 8 9 12 21 20 
District courts/ 
Administrative and labor 
courts/Company 
registration courts 
88 58 34 16 122 74 
 
 
2.3.4. In-service judicial trainings 
The idea of establishing a central institution dedicated to judicial trainings was born in 2000 and a 
few years later, in 2006 the Hungarian Judicial Academy (Magyar Bíróképző Akadémia) started to 
provide courses and training for judges It is currently functioning under the name of the Hungarian 
Academy of Justice, and is organisationally integrated into the NOJ. 
 
According to Article 76 (7) of the AOAC the President of the NOJ is in charge of determining the 
tasks regarding judicial trainings at national level and she is responsible for monitoring the execution 
of educational programs. Within her capacity, the President shall develop an annual program for 
trainings in which the topics that are prioritized in the given year are clearly indicated. The NCJ can 
participate in this process by making its own initiative or providing opinion on the trainings plan. The 
President of the NOJ is also responsible for defining the tasks at regional level. 
 
In 2012, when the first President of the newly established NOJ announced her program, the 
improvement of the existing scheme of judicial trainings was among the main objectives of the 
judicial administration. 
 
The President of the NOJ acknowledged in her report that the previous system for trainings was 
ineffective since local and regional trainings were not coordinated at all. While the law had made 
judicial trainings compulsory before 2012, only trainees and clerks were in fact obliged to participate 
in trainings. As a result, voluntary training was the norm with regard to judges, and only junior judges 
had to attend compulsory training – a so-called initial training (see 2.2.4 above.) 
 
The Act of CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges (hereinafter: Status Act) 
also prescribes compulsory trainings for judges on a regular basis, but it does not determine the exact 
time (hours or days) judges have to spent on compulsory trainings in a given year (Article 45.) In 
2012 the new training system was not yet established, and in 2013, Hungary still lacked general 
compulsory training for judges. Nevertheless, the number of the available trainings has increased 
significantly in recent years and by now, the compulsory in-service training for professional judges 
has also been introduced. Judges have to attend some compulsory trainings each year. The main topics 
are determined by the central judicial administration yearly in the annual training plan, on the 
proposals of judges or courts. Trainings are coordinated at the central level by the Hungarian 
Academy of Justice, but then organized and held primarily at the regional and local level. 
 
The trainings are held mostly by the so-called ‘trainers’ who are actually senior judges of appellate 
courts. A judge can be qualified as a ‘trainer’ after having attended courses which are held by the 
Hungarian Academy of Justice and called ‘the trainers’ training’. Sometimes, external experts are 
also invited to speak, but lectures are held most of the times by judges. In 2017, for instance, judges 
serving in the civil branch were obliged to participate in an eight-day long training on the newly 
adopted act on civil procedure. Apart from division-specific trainings, general trainings are also held. 
In 2017, a one-day compulsory training was organized around the comprehensibility and 
understandability of judgments and this training must be attended by each judge. (The year 2017 is 
officially dedicated to comprehensibility in the justice system.) 
 
Judges can choose from a great variety of voluntary trainings which concern typically the subject-
matters of newly enacted laws just as the basic and advanced skills and competences needed for 
judges.  
 
If a judge fails to participate in the compulsory trainings due to her fault, she must be subjected to 
extraordinary supervision and the judge is not allowed to apply for a higher judicial position.  
 
Since 2012 managerial trainings for court presidents have been organized at the Hungarian Academy 
of Justice. These trainings target primarily the development of managerial skills and competences 
and to some extent promoting business and economic education among court presidents. 
 
Currently, a new system for registering judicial trainings is being developed in order to gain easily 
accessible information on which trainings individual judges attend. This initiative is intended to 
provide a unified registration system in this field. 
 
2.3.5. Consequences of the judicial evaluation on the quality of justice 
Judicial evaluation in Hungary combines three aspects (quantitative, qualitative and judicial skills) 
and the evaluative criteria are determined in detail. This makes the work of the assessor easier and 
the system of assessment more objective. The quality criteria and judicial skills to be assessed are 
relevant for the evaluation of the judicial activity. However, there is no methodological guidelines for 
the assessor judges (for example what are the evaluating standards of ‘careful attention’, analytical 
thinking’ or ‘foresight’ and what the hierarchy between these faculties is), thus the substantive part 
of the evaluation is not uniform in the country.  
 
It is hard to judge the impact of the assessment on the quality of justice. Firstly, because the current 
regime is quite a new one (even if it has not transformed fundamentally the previous one). Secondly, 
because, as opposed to the quantitative evaluation, there are no clear and measurable indicators of 
quality of justice. In general, it can only be said that the concept of quality of justice in Hungary is 
understood as meeting the requirement set by the higher courts. If a judge’s activity satisfies appellate 
judges then the quality of her work is considered high. That attitude is reflected in the current 
evaluation system where the opinion of court users does not matter at all (although, for example, 
extraordinary and continuously high proportion of appeals against judgments of a given judge can 
reliably indicate a problem with her professional competence). 
 
Apart from these problems, the new system of evaluation in which each of the above-listed quality 
criteria and judicial skills are marked separately by the assessor can help judges improve their judicial 
performance in the fields where it is needed. Nonetheless, it seems that quality improvement of 
complex intellectual activities such as judicial reasoning or evaluation of evidence needs more effort 
than regular assessment of judges.48 
 
It is also worth noting that an implicit assumption is reflected in the current evaluation system: for a 
Hungarian judge, a good judicial career is equal to an appointment to a higher court (higher prestige, 
higher salary etc.). That is why the most ambitious judges focus their effort to achieve an appointment 
to a higher court. (It is not a coincidence that the best outcome of the regular assessment is “competent 
for higher judicial position”.) Consequently, the most excellent and most experienced judges are 
appointed to higher (appellate) courts while at the district court – where the vast majority of cases 
starts and finishes – judges with less experience adjudicate. It is a reasonable demand, however, from 
the public that first instance court should operate at the same quality as higher courts 
 
2.3.6. Debate on possible reforms 
2.3.6.1. Evaluation of judges 
For the sake of excluding prejudice and exacting a uniform application of the law, the evaluation of 
the judicial activity should be carried out on the basis of the system that is used during the quality 
examination of scientific publications. Therefore, assessment of judgments rendered by a judge could 
be trusted to professionally renowned fellow justices functioning at other regional courts of law, who 
would give their opinion on the particular judge’s work based on anonymized decisions and case files 
(‘blind peer-review’). This way, disparities of legal practice and reasoning style within the country 
may be brought to the surface more easily apart from the objective assessment of the particular judge. 
This kind of blind peer-review system could bring awareness to dispensing justice.49 
 
2.3.6.2. Homogenous professional background of judges 
A pitfall of the professional homogeneity (judge-trainees, court clerks) of the selected judges may be 
that the vast majority of the judges has never seen the reality of the “other side” of court cases. For 
example, as for the fact-finding in the Hungarian criminal procedure the crucial period is the police 
investigation. Judges mostly base the factual ground of their decisions on testimonies and other 
evidence recorded and collected during the investigation.50 Attorneys often complain that judges have 
no clue whether the pieces of evidence gathered by the police are really reliable or not, nonetheless, 
they accept them even if evidence revealed before the court points to the opposite direction. Judges 
may be more sensitive to this problem with previous work experience as an attorney, or a longer 
internship at the police or at the prosecution office.51 
 
2.4. The evaluation of courts activities 
2.4.1. Actors involved 
Court evaluation is managed by the central judicial administration, especially by the NOJ through 
strategies and indicators that are determined almost exclusively at national level. Local initiatives 
are underdeveloped, but we can find some promising projects at this level as well. One of these 
projects is the so-called “Debrecen model”. This will be briefly presented in section 3.4, under the 
heading “innovative practices”. External actors such as representatives of other legal professions or 
                                                 
48 For a recent quality project that has addressed judicial writing see sub-section 3.3. In relation with the evaluation of 
evidence (confirmed by judges) our experience is that a ’copy-paste’ method is spreading across Hungarian criminal 
courts. This means that the judge copies the testimonies of witnesses, experts and defendants from the records then pastes 
them in the judgment while ignores to explain her reasons to accept or refuse the relevant pieces of evidence. 
49See http://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/14_Bencze_Matyas_Bado_Attila.pdf 
50 According to a research conducted by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, a very high number of convicted persons 
complained about illegal (physical or psychological) pressure from the side of the police in order to get confession from 
them. See Kádár, András: A vétkesség vélelme, [Presumption of Guilt] Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, Budapest, 2004, pp. 
53–78 
51See Bencze, Mátyás, „Nincs füst, ahol nincsen tűz” [Where There Is Smoke, There Is Fire], Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 
2016, p. 178. 
the Ministry of Justice do not participate in this process. Nevertheless, the NOJ is making efforts to 
involve court users in this exercise by encouraging courts to conduct customer satisfaction surveys. 
However, this latter initiative, as we will see below, is also in its infancy. 
 
2.4.2. Evaluation process 
According to the AOAC, the President of the NOJ determines and annually updates the agenda of 
judicial administration which encompasses the long-term objectives of the Hungarian judiciary and 
the conditions for fulfilling these aims.52 Within her capacity, in 2012, the President of the NOJ has 
established the fundamental strategic objectives of the Hungarian judiciary. These goals include 
(1) an independent judiciary administering high-quality and timely justice; (2) the optimal allocation 
and utilization of human and (3) material resources; (4) the integrity of the judicial organization, and 
a transparent adjudication and judicial administration, the latter being also predictable and controlled; 
(5) easy access to courts and finally, (6) the improvement of the training system and cooperation with 
other legal professions. Among these objectives, the first one – the quality and timeliness of justice 
provided by independent judges – is of crucial importance concerning the constitutional role of the 
courts, and all the other aims may serve as means to achieve the first and most important objective. 
The former six goals are still in place in 2017 and available at the website of the NOJ.53 The 
objectives set out by the President of the NOJ can be reference points in establishing the criteria of 
assessing courts’ activities. 
 
The President of the NOJ has to submit an annual report to the Parliament on the actual situation 
and performance of the judiciary. The President also reports on these issues to the parliamentary 
committee on justice once a year. The findings of these reports contain data on the performance of 
the courts, so we rely mainly on these reports and the background statistical data when seeking to 
collect the existing methods for assessing the courts’ performance in Hungary. 
 
In 2012, the new head of judicial administration took office, and in her first report she made some 
general observations concerning the performance of the Hungarian judiciary. The report of the 
President of the NOJ pointed out that the excessive workload of the judges had made it difficult to 
achieve the goals of quality and efficiency simultaneously. The report highlighted huge differences 
in the workload of individual judges and various courts in the last 11 years.54 There were courts 
where judges had to deal with over two and the half times more incoming cases than judges serving 
at other courts. These differences were even higher with regard to the total number of pending cases 
and the rate of the cases pending over 2 years before courts, and the central region produced the worst 
figure in this regard. The President’s report pointed out further deficiencies in administering justice 
in Hungary, namely the lack of coherence in judicial practice and the issue of timeliness which also 
resulted in significant differences across courts. The report stated that these defects stemmed to a 
large extent from the failures of the previous model of judicial administration. Therefore, the 
primary task of the judicial administration in the early 2010s was to reduce the enormous workload 
of the judges in order to provide them with sufficient time for deciding every single case on the merit. 
Fewer cases per judges would improve the timeliness of the proceedings which are intimately 
intertwined with human rights claims, such as access to justice or fair trial. Furthermore, if human 
resources are properly allocated within the judicial system, the quality of judicial activity would likely 
be improved. Finally, the administrative burden on judges was considered extremely high which 
                                                 
52 Article 76 (1) of the AOAC 
53 See the central website of the Hungarian judiciary: http://birosag.hu/obh/strategia. For a detailed description of the 
strategic objectives in English see: http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/stat-tart-
file/english_strategy_corrected_3_1.pdf 
54http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/obh/elnoki-beszamolok/obhe_beszamolo_2012_ifelev_teljes.pdf 
A judge confirmed that in the last few years, the judicial system had to tackle with huge workload imbalances that 
originated in the pre-2010 period. 
could have a negative impact on the timeliness of justice as well. Hence, in 2012 the central 
administration aimed also at reducing the administrative tasks of the individual judges in the short 
run, primarily by increasing the number of the administrative staff of the judiciary. (However, in 2017 
one judge still finds the administrative tasks enormous and burdensome and his staff too small and 
underqualified. He has named this difficulty first within those factors that hinder high-quality and 
effective adjudication. Nevertheless, a judge working at a smaller court has not complained about the 
huge administrative burden.) 
 
2.4.2.1. Performance indicators  
In Hungary, the day-to-day activity of the individual judges and courts is subject to monitoring and 
evaluation on a regular basis. Performance indicators exist, and the benchmarks can be found in the 
annual report of the President of the NOJ. We were told that more or less the same indicators (see 
below) have been applied for a long time (more than 20 years) by the Hungarian judicial 
administration to monitor the performance of the courts. The indicators were established in the office 
of the central judicial administration, particularly at the statistical department by expert statisticians, 
based on popular statistical methods and on those databases which contain information conveyed by 
individual judges. Currently, we have no further information on whether any other actors had 
participated in the process of determining the methods of evaluation. 
 
It is important to note at the outset, that the comprehensive reform of the management system after 
2011 which institutionalized a highly centralized judicial administration led by a single person, has 
been carried out with the aim of improving the quality and efficiency of administering justice in 
Hungary. As we will see, the new administration put a great emphasis on the clearly visible 
“numbers” in terms of the performance of the justice system which constitute only one aspect 
of quality. 
 
The performance indicators, according to the annual reports of the President of the NOJ, encompass 
(1) incoming cases, (2) resolved cases (3) backlog, (4) timeliness (length of proceedings) (5) 
workload (6) appeal ratio. These items provide easily quantifiable results concerning the performance 
of the Hungarian courts. 
 
Incoming cases 
The central judicial administration keeps a record of and publishes each year the total number of 
incoming cases. This data itself provides little information about the performance of the judiciary. 
However, this figure is relevant if it is compared to the number of resolved cases in the same year, as 
the two can highlight the so-called “clearance rate” which is a telling figure of the effectiveness of 
the justice system. Furthermore, registering the total number of incoming cases is important since it 
allows to assess if the current judicial staff can deal with the caseload. Consequently, we can draw 
inferences from this figure on the suitability of human and material resources. The Hungarian 
judiciary traditionally deals with a huge caseload. In the last few years the number of incoming cases 
has significantly exceeded a million on an annual basis. In 2016, 1.411.569 cases were filed with the 
Hungarian courts. This, however, shows a slow decline compared to previous years’ figures.55 
 
Resolved cases 
The number of resolved cases is also published in the reports of the President of the NOJ. This data 
is important with regard to the “clearance rate” of the Hungarian judiciary. As to clearance rate, 
Hungary performed very well in the early 2010’s56, but today, it does not rank so high among 
                                                 
55 http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/obh/elnoki-beszamolok/elnoki_beszamolo_2016_online.pdf 
56 Data of the 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-
justice/files/justice_scoreboard_2014_en.pdf (figure 5, page 10) 
Member States according to the EU Justice Scoreboard 2017.57 But as we lack basic information on 
the reasons for the changes in the ranking, we cannot provide a plausible interpretation on this issue.58 
Nevertheless, this indicator can hardly be seen as a reliable one unless the term “resolved case” is 
clearly defined. For instance, for the performance of the courts it is significant how decisions are 
counted: namely, if decisions transferring a case to the competent court or joining two or more cases 
are relevant for the category of final cases, or only judgments on the merits are counted in this regard. 
The lack of a clear definition on “final or resolved cases” decreases the validity of this figure and 
makes the comparison between Member States difficult. 
 
Backlog 
In Hungary, the backlog of the courts is monitored and measured at all court instances and concerning 
all case-types. According to the annual report of the President of the NOJ, between 2013 and 2015 
the backlog of the courts dropped year by year. All court levels – except the Curia – were able to 
reduce the number of pending cases in almost all types of cases (in litigious and non-litigious cases, 
in cases of minor offences and concerning business entities etc.). In the last few years, special efforts 
were made by the courts to cut the massive backlog, in particular the number of “old” cases. The 
courts were very successful in this respect. We will discuss below the special projects that have been 
dedicated to reducing the backlog of the courts. 
  
Timeliness (Length of Proceedings) 
Timely adjudication is a crucial issue for the central judicial administration which is reflected in the 
fact that recently, numerous distinctive programs have been explicitly dedicated to reducing the 
number of cases pending before Hungarian courts for a long time. Here, we present some general 
figures regarding the timeliness of adjudication in Hungary. According to the annual reports, in 2014, 
77% of the proceedings finished within 1 year. This figure raised to 87% in 2015 which shows an 
improvement on the part of the courts in this regard. In Hungary, those cases that have not been solved 
within 2 years are considered ‘old’ ones. The presidents of the courts and the head of departments 
pay special attention to these old cases. Judges must report on a monthly basis on the measures that 
have been taken to complete those cases pending more than 2 years. Since 2014, judges must be 
subject to extraordinary evaluation if a case has not been resolved in 2 years due to the fault of the 
judge.59 
 
In 2015 an online “warning system” was introduced which notifies the judge on the important 
deadlines she must meet in a given proceeding (“határidő-figyelő”). Judges receive notice if, for 
instance, the deadline for taking the first action after the assignment of the case, for making a written 
record of the hearing or for making the written form of the judgment is expiring or has already 
expired.  
 
Workload 
The central judicial administration puts a heavy emphasis on the goal of ensuring a balanced workload 
for judges. In this regard, the NOJ’s proposal stated that the differences should ideally be less than 
15% compared to the average workload. According to figures from 2011 the courts of central 
Hungary and Budapest had an excessive workload: the number of pending cases judges had to deal 
with was 140% of the average workload. By the end of 2015, this number dropped significantly in 
                                                 
57 http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=43918 
58 The Hungarian media have recently reported that some judges sitting on the Budapest Capital Administrative and Labor 
Court received a letter from their administrative superior in which they were called to give evidence on why they had 
failed to resolve at least ten cases in February 2017. (See 
http://hvg.hu/itthon/20170327_Hando_birosag_teljesitmeny_autonomia_munkajog. Last access: 4 April 2017)  
59 Article 69. c) of the Status Act 
the central region, and the figure was only slightly above the average which also decreased 
considerably, from 112 to 78.  
 
Figure 3: Workload of the judges in different district courts by regions in criminal cases (case/judge)60 
 
 
31.12.2011.      31.12.2015. 
 
 
By now, the workload has thus become much more balanced, but, as the Hungarian social, 
economic and political life is heavily capital-oriented, the courts in the central region remain the most 
vulnerable to a massive caseload. In Hungary, Budapest – the most densely populated city – has 
nearly ten times more inhabitants than other big cities in the country which intrinsically implies a 
huge caseload compared to other areas. Furthermore, as political and business life are largely 
concentrated in the capital, courts in this region have to deal with the most complex and difficult 
cases which may also result in an excessive workload. For this reason, the situation of the central 
region attracts the most attention from the central administration.  
Later, we will return to the issue of judicial workload in order to present the recent developments in 
this field. As reducing workload imbalances constitutes a strategic goal of the central judicial 
administration, new methods for workload measurement have been established to receive more 
reliable and comparable data on this issue. 
 
Appeal ratio 
Data on the appeal ratio has been published since 2011. In the annual report of the President of the 
NOJ these data are presented under the heading “the soundness of adjudication”. Until 2014, the 
judicial register did not make it possible to obtain data directly and explicitly on the appeal rates, so 
the figures were based on all types of judicial decisions and were calculated in a way that the incoming 
appellate cases of regional courts in a given year were compared to the resolved cases of the previous 
year at district courts. Now, in order to get the appeal rate, the number of the resolved cases at first 
instance is compared to the incoming new cases at second instance in the period considered. Certainly, 
the many ways of calculating appeal rate make the comparison of the annual figures difficult. 
Nevertheless, one can see the endeavors of the judicial administration to establish more sophisticated 
methods for obtaining reliable data on the performance of the courts in this regard. 
 
As to appeal rate, we find this quality benchmark relevant since it represents an external perspective, 
namely the opinion of court users. If one of the parties of the proceeding is not satisfied with the 
                                                 
60 2015 annual report of the President of the NOJ, 29. http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/obh/elnoki-
beszamolok/2015._eves_elnoki_beszamolo.pdf 
court’s decision she can appeal against it to a higher court. Our assumption is that in courts which 
produced significantly higher appellate rate year by year than others something went wrong.  
According to the annual report of the NOJ, the appeal rate reflects the quality of verdicts in terms 
of their soundness. The Hungarian figures from 2014, 2015 and 2016 show that approximately 80 
percent of the decisions are not subject to appeal and therefore, become final right at first instance in 
district courts’ civil, administrative and labor proceedings.61 The appeal ratio varies considerably 
within the country according to the data from 2016, approximately between 14% and 29%, so the 
highest rate is more than double of the lowest. It is the district courts belonging to the jurisdiction of 
the Budapest Capital Regional Court that have the highest appeal rate. 
Data on appeal ratio in criminal cases in the years 2015 and 2016 also reveals huge differences 
between courts. The average appeal rate was 21,5% and 21,2% in the respective years, but the rates 
varied from 12,3% to 35% in 2015, and from 14,5% to 32,2% in 2016. The following table shows the 
exact figures broken down to regional courts. 
 
 
Figure 4: Appeal ratio in criminal cases in 2015 and 201662 
 
 
 
The 2016 detailed report on the caseload and activity of the judiciary also indicates the rate of quashed 
decisions of district courts in civil and criminal matters: the figures vary from 0,27% to 1,27% in 
civil, and from 0,62% to 2,53% in criminal cases.  
 
Figure 4: Quashed decisions in criminal cases - 201663 
 
                                                 
61 See http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/obh/elnoki-beszamolok/elnoki_beszamolo_2014.pdf (p. 33) 
http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/obh/elnoki-beszamolok/2015._eves_elnoki_beszamolo.pdf (p. 38) 
62 http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/stat-tart-file/beszamolo_2016._ev.pdf#overlay-context=kozerdeku-
informaciok/statisztikai-adatok/ugyforgalmi-adatok 
63 http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/stat-tart-file/beszamolo_2016._ev.pdf#overlay-context=kozerdeku-
informaciok/statisztikai-adatok/ugyforgalmi-adatok 
 
We find it an important development in terms of quality assessment that a more sophisticated method 
has been established to determine appeal ratio, and more detailed data on quashed decisions are also 
available now. 
 
2.4.2.2. Performance targets 
Today, some performance targets are set for judges at national level. At court level, the president 
of the court or the head of the department can determine minimal standards for ensuring the 
productivity and effectiveness of administration of justice. Performance targets can be set for each 
individual judge. As far as we know, general standards are not specified to courts, goals for 
productivity are defined mostly in temporary projects (see below). Nevertheless, courts have to 
establish annual work plans in which goals in terms of productivity could be set in advance. In 
addition, the project proposals of the presidents submitted in their application for the positions of 
court president serve as institutional strategies of the courts since the main medium-term objectives 
at court level are set within that. 
 
Performance targets for judges encompass some minimum standards such as hearing days per week 
(a judge adjudicates at a court of first instance must hold hearings on two days a week) or the 
productivity of hearing days. This latter objective is defined by law: Article 54 of the Status Act 
requires judges to hold hearings on hearing days in a way that makes effective use of the time 
spending with hearings and facilitates the handling of cases within a reasonable time frame. Presidents 
of the courts can also determine performance targets at court level. The standards defined by the 
presidents do not necessarily coincide with those that are determined at national level. Presidential 
resolutions or local regulations for the organization and operation of the courts may contain lower 
and higher standards as well, for instance concerning the number of hearing days. As we have already 
indicated above, according to media coverage, at the Budapest Capital Administrative and Labor 
Court two judges were required to give reasons for failing to resolve at least 10 cases per months. 
The president of the court probably expected a minimum standard of productivity from the judges in 
terms of the number of resolved cases. The Budapest Capital Regional Court (and lower courts belong 
to it) traditionally deals with a heavy workload and the president might have found it important for 
timely adjudication to exert a tough control over the backlog in that way.  
 
 
If these above standards are not met by the individual judge in the long run, the president, first, may 
check the administrative record of the judge, and if these data prove to be insufficient to substantiate 
the poor performance of the judge, the president may ask the judge to provide a report on the reasons 
for his failing to comply with the expected standards. As we indicated above, if a tried case is not 
finished within two years, this fact is a reason for extraordinary evaluation of a judge. 
 
In 2014, some courts carried out self-assessment process based on CAF 201364 to reveal the 
strengths and weaknesses of the organization. These courts then proposed action plans based on the 
findings of the evaluation procedure. The NOJ and the Curia also participated in this project and 
applied the CAF. This quality management tool has not been introduced within the judiciary (it is not 
a mandatory instrument) but courts that carried out self-assessment with the help of this framework 
emphasized their commitment to regularly apply CAF in the future. Some courts published their 
reports on the assessment procedure and these are available on the internet. The Eger Regional Court 
identified the existing reward scheme as an improvement area: a more transparent and objective 
system would be needed to better motivate judges and reward excellent performance.65 The Budapest 
Environs Regional Court presented the huge administrative burden and the great deal of old cases as 
problems that should also be handled.66The action plan of the Curia put a heavy emphasis on 
developing internal and external communication.67 
 
2.4.2.3. Data for the assessment 
According to Article 76 (4) (e) of the AOAC, the President of the NOJ is in charge of developing and 
reviewing the methods and datasheets for measuring judicial workload. The President has to 
monitor the workload and the caseload of the courts and it is her duty to determine the general annual 
workload for each judicial instance broken down to different case-types. 
 
In the early 2010s the central judicial administration found the former system for data collection 
deficient and insufficient, and indicated that the scope of the information needed for the inquiry 
had to be broadened. There was thus a pressing need for establishing novel means to gather 
information that can serve as a basis for performance assessment of the judiciary. 
 
In Hungary, very detailed statistics are produced with regard to the activity of the judicial system. 
The President of the NOJ is responsible for collecting statistical data, and this process is carried out 
mainly within the framework of a national program called OSAP (Országos Statisztikai Adatgyűjtési 
Program) as the NOJ is an integral part of the Official Statistical Service. Some additional information 
is known from the online registers of the courts. 
 
Individual judges are obliged to provide data on their judicial activity on a regular basis. Methods for 
recording data vary from court to court. All judges must keep a ‘hearing book’ in which each 
phases of the trial and all the other details of the case must be registered. At some courts, these data 
must be supplied by the judges on paper, while at other courts via the internal IT system of the 
judiciary. Ultimately, all relevant information is included into an electronic register to which the 
central judicial administration has access. 
 
Courts are obliged to provide information on a monthly basis concerning the activities of individual 
judges. The scope of the datasheets has not changed considerably in recent times, even if the report 
of the President of the NOJ from 2012 emphasized the need for improvement in data collection. It 
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seems to us, that a long-standing and well-established practice exists for recording the workload and 
other activities of individual judges. 
 
Besides, presidents of courts have to make annual reports in which the NOJ must be informed 
about the performance of the court. In the process of collecting and conveying data and compiling 
the annual report of the president, the statistician of the court plays a crucial role and she relies 
primarily on the court’s register. The head of departments are also involved in this process of data 
collection as they also exert administrative control over the performance of the adjudicative panels.  
The NOJ examines the provided data and makes publicly available reports upon these data on the 
functioning of the courts on an annual and semi-annual basis. 
 
2.4.2.4. Tools for eliminating workload imbalances  
As we have already stated above, workload imbalances have been a long-standing issue of the 
functioning of the Hungarian judiciary. Since 2012, it is a primary objective and strategic goal of the 
central judicial administration to make the highly uneven workload of individual judges more 
balanced. In an oral evidence before the Constitutional Court, the President of the NOJ marked the 
imbalances of judicial workload as being the most pressing and serious issue of judicial 
administration since the 1989 democratic transition. So far, various attempts have been made to 
mitigate or eliminate the huge workload differences between judges. Beside deploying transitional 
solutions such as (1) judicial secondment, (2) the short-lived system of case transfer, and (3) 
establishing positions for “mobile judges”, the central administration has taken important steps to 
develop the adequate method for workload measurement. Three projects have already been dedicated 
to this objective, two of which have been implemented at an initial stage: these are (4) the “case 
registry” based on weights allocated to case-types and (5) the “ratio tables”. In the following section, 
we will provide a brief overview on these devices.  
 
Judicial secondment 
Within the Hungarian judiciary, in order to ensure a balanced workload among individual judges and 
to accomplish the goal of administering justice in a timely fashion, the means of seconding judges is 
extensively used by the presidents of the courts. It is the president of the regional court who can 
decide on judicial secondment within the jurisdiction of the regional court, and the President of the 
NOJ can assign judges from one regional court or regional court of appeal to another and from or to 
the Curia as well. Generally, judges must give their consent to their secondment, especially if they 
keep on adjudicating in their original venue in the meantime. However, judges can be assigned to 
another venue without their consent in every three-year time for a maximum of one year. The figures 
show that in 2014, 739 judges were seconded by the presidents of regional courts, and 303 judges by 
the President of the NOJ. In 2015, the numbers peaked at 1264 and 406, and then dropped to 834 and 
394 in 2016. The remarkably high numbers of the year 2015 are explained by the President of the 
NOJ in part by the surge in asylum seekers. The figures, nevertheless, reflect that judicial secondment 
constitutes the most frequently applied temporary remedy for caseload imbalances.  
The system of transferring cases – a failed attempt 
In order to reach a significant improvement in the timeliness of justice in the short run, from 2012 the 
President of the NOJ had been entrusted with the power to transfer a case from the competent court 
to another one if the former had an enormous workload which was likely to compromise the timely 
resolution of the case in question. This new competence of the central judicial administration was 
justified by the goal of an effective time management in administration of justice and was not an 
unprecedented instrument in this regard in Hungary. Case transfer as a possible remedy for the 
massive backlog and delays within the Hungarian judiciary was originally introduced in 2011 and it 
was the Supreme Court that could decide, on the proposal of the President of the National Judicial 
Council, on reallocating cases from one court to another. The presidents of the regional courts and 
regional courts of appeal could initiate this procedure. Later, also in 2011 the Act on Criminal 
Procedure was amended, and the Chief Prosecutor was given the power of case transfer in “cases of 
great importance”: the competent public prosecutor could institute a criminal proceeding before non-
competent courts upon the decision of the Chief Prosecutor with regard to the reasonable time frame 
requirement. It was this latter provision that was first struck down by the Constitutional Court at the 
end of 2011.68 Nevertheless, case transfer was preserved in 2012 and the government made several 
attempts to establish the constitutional grounds of this institution: it was incorporated into the 
Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law and then into its Fourth Amendment, after the former 
was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. It is also telling that the President of the NOJ 
invoked foreign countries inter alia the Netherlands as an example where the same practice existed.69 
 
The system of the transfer of cases was subjected to fierce criticism from its inception in Hungary 
and abroad.70 It was considered to be capable of undermining the principle of fair trial (among them 
the right to a lawful judge, judicial impartiality or the principle of the equality of arms) by being used 
in cases of great political importance. The huge controversy was triggered mainly by the failures of 
the relevant legal framework to provide sufficient guarantees against the arbitrary decision of the 
President of the NOJ. As Hungary was put under international pressure in this regard, the government 
finally retreated, and the system was repealed by the legislature in 2013. Shortly afterwards, the 
Constitutional Court also declared the relevant legal rules which were not in effect anymore but on 
which proceedings were still pending, unconstitutional.71 
 
However, this sort of threat was not fully eliminated, since the system of designating judges to cases 
that originally belong to the competence of other courts is still in place, and in most instances, it is 
not the judges but rather the cases that are in fact transferred from one court to another. For instance, 
if a judge or a court is designated to adjudicate a case or a group of cases pending before another 
court, the designated judge or court in fact sits within it original venue and hears the given case there. 
Even the President of the NOJ acknowledged in oral evidence given to the Constitutional Court that 
the established practice of judicial secondment was de facto tantamount to transferring cases to newly 
designated courts due to the above-mentioned reasons. A recent report of a famous Hungarian weekly 
“HVG” has also emphasized that in the name of judicial secondment, many times, it is not the judge 
but the case files that are moving from one court to another.72 The threat that judicial independence 
can also be compromised by seconding judges to certain cases lies in the fact that the case-assignment 
system is not fully automatic in every court (see below), thus the judge who is responsible for 
assignment can decide alone on allocating cases to the designated judge/judicial panel. 
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 “Mobile judges” 
In Hungary, under Article 33 of the Status Act, judges can be appointed to positions for a 3-year term 
(initial appointment) which imply a changing venue for administering justice. The instrument of the 
so-called “mobile judge” (“mozgóbíró”) is typically deployed if there are huge imbalances in the 
caseload among district courts belonging to the jurisdiction of a given regional court. The position 
itself indicates that the judge can be assigned to various venues to administer justice without giving 
her consent to it each and every time. In 2015, 13 positions of that kind were called for by the 
President of the NOJ, while in 2016 only 7 statuses for “mobile judges” were established. These 
figures suggest that judicial secondment as an alternative to establishing positions to changing venues 
is a more established practice in Hungary to ensure a balanced workload for individual judges and 
the timeliness of administering justice.  
 
Case weights and the ‘case registry’ – a new scheme for classifying cases 
In Hungary courts have to make annual plans for case allocation which is determined primarily by 
the president of the court. The departments and the Local Judicial Council express their opinions on 
the annual plan. Case allocation can also be determined by other judges appointed to this task by the 
president. As a result, in principle, cases are not automatically assigned to judges. Although Articles 
9-11 of the AOAC lay down the fundamental principles of case allocation, they allow a broad 
discretion for presidents. Since these annual plans are open for the public, it is evident that many of 
them institutionalize an essentially automatic allocation system which takes into consideration the 
subject-matter and the date of receipt of the case. However, we can also find case allocation plans 
which state only laconically the following: it is the president who decides on this issue. 
 
In 2012, the central administration of the Hungarian judiciary announced the plan of developing a 
new scheme called “case registry” (ügykataszter) for classifying incoming cases on the basis of their 
types and difficulty level. The process was launched in the hope that the new registry would contribute 
to a more sophisticated system of case allocation and would provide a firm ground for ensuring a 
balanced workload for judges. The new registry was also expected to facilitate access to more reliable 
statistical data on the performance of individual judges and courts. The “case registry” was developed 
by the NOJ between 2012-2014, and by now, it is being applied in criminal and civil cases. The most 
important element of the registry is the system of case weights (súlyszám-rendszer). While the 
general weights attached to particular case-types have been developed within the NOJ, the head of 
the departments and individual judges were also involved in the process. 
 
A recent order of the President of the NOJ [no. 18/2016. (XII. 30.)] provides a definition of „case 
registry” which reads as follows: it is a current list of cases which indicates the type of the case (the 
specific subject-matter of the case), the code number and the weight assigned to each type. 
 
Due to the establishment of case weights, today, case allocation depends not on sheer numbers, as it 
was the case before, when the practice of distributing cases among judges on an equal basis was based 
on the orthodox view that judicial workload would be balanced in the long run anyway. By now, a 
much more refined system has been introduced which takes into consideration the case-type 
(primarily the subject-matter) and the complexity of the case (in criminal cases, for instance, the 
number of the accused persons within the proceeding, the length of the indictment, or if foreign law 
needs to be applied etc.). At first, cases were given a weight from 1 to 5 based on the subject matter; 
from 2017, for practical purposes, the scale ranges from 10 to 50. These weights are adjusted to the 
complexity of the cases. For instance, if the number of the parties in civil or administrative cases is 
above 6, the weight of the case increases by 20%, or the same degree of diversion is applied if the 
length of the application exceeds 10 pages. In criminal matters, if more than 3 people are accused in 
one proceeding, the weight of the given case increases by 40%, and the weights also rise if the number 
of witnesses or experts is high.  
 
The new system was generally welcomed by judges as it provides an objective system for case 
allocation, therefore serves as an important check on the administrative practice in this regard. Due 
to case weights, the workload of the judges can be compared and balanced much easier, and we can 
obtain more reliable data on the performance of individual judges. The registry is subjected to an 
ongoing supervision for making it more refined. The major problem lies in the fact, that the weight is 
assigned to the case at the very beginning of the trial (initial weight), and the complexity of the case 
can change in the meanwhile. This problem is relevant primarily in civil matters. Judicial complaints 
have targeted this latter difficulty, and all these challenges have been taken seriously and assessed 
thoroughly. As a response to these challenges, the District Court of Debrecen, for instance, introduced 
the system of “post-weighing” of cases in civil matters to obtain a more reliable calculation of 
judicial workload, but this method is used only if the weight of the case increases during the 
proceeding. 
 
Case weights have been determined in all fields: in civil, criminal, administrative and labor cases as 
well. However, as we have been informed, small district courts with a very few judges have not 
implemented the system and preserved the traditional case allocation system in which each judge 
receives the same number of cases. 
 
It is widely held by judges, that case weights allow the comparison of individual judges’ workload 
only within one particular court and amongst judges who deal with similar case-types, as in the 
process of determining the initial weight of a given case, many subjective components can have a 
bearing, and a lot depends on the individual assessment of the judge charged with case allocation. 
This latter observation and the fact that case weights have not been introduced in every court have 
led to the development of another tool which enables the comparison of the courts’ workload at 
national level. This instrument which will be presented in the next section is called “ratio tables”. 
 
“Ratio Tables” (Aránytáblák) 
In 2015 a project was launched by the NOJ in order to develop an adequate method for measuring 
judicial workload. The project has resulted in the establishment of tables on the ratios of the incoming 
cases and the authorized judicial staff which provide comparable data on the workload of courts 
broken down to case-types and judicial instances. 
 
The concept of establishing the tables was grounded on the idea that judicial secondment is only a 
temporary solution, so the balanced workload across courts as well as timely adjudication can be 
provided in the long run by creating new positions at those courts where it is needed due to the huge 
workload. 
 
These tables are primarily utilized in the process of filling vacancies, since the figures can show if 
the vacancy needs to be filled at the court concerned, or the position must rather be transferred from 
one court to another or must be abolished. The tables can also be used when a decision on the 
temporary secondment of a judge must be made. Consequently, the tables can contribute to making 
well-established and justified decisions in the field of human resources management. The tables 
which build on the data of the last 12 months are updated on a monthly basis. 
 
Apart from the tables on the ratios of incoming cases and judicial positions, the number of the resolved 
and pending cases per judges in each case-type and at every court level is also recorded by the NOJ 
in order that the average workload of an individual judge to be determined at national level. The 
President of the NOJ shall publish on a semi-annual basis these data on the intranet of the judiciary. 
Presidents of regional courts and regional courts of appeal also participate in the process of workload 
measurement and shall take the necessary steps if long-standing and significant discrepancies in the 
workload of the judges occur. Presidents are responsible for the continuous monitoring of the number 
of incoming cases and the development of the judicial staff within the court that works under their 
leadership, and they also have to determine and publish quarterly the average number of incoming 
cases per judges and the average workload of the judges taking into account the weights assigned to 
the cases. 
 
While some judges during informal talks have found the introduction of the tables a very successful 
initiative, the report of the HVG have provided a much more pessimistic picture on this issue. 
Referring to internal information and undisclosed documents, the article stressed that some judges in 
the central region have recently resigned due to the enormous workload they should have tackled, 
and some others have criticized heavily the President of the NOJ in the sitting of the NCJ as they 
found the policy of the central administration on filling vacancies and balancing the workload 
differences non-transparent and a failed attempt.73 As we were not permitted to conduct any 
interview with judges who are members of the NCJ, and the records of the sittings of the NCJ is not 
accessible to the public (only available for judges via the intranet system), we cannot give greater 
details on this debate. 
 
It is interesting though that while the annual reports of the President of the NOJ have indicated a 
significant improvement in ensuring a much more balanced workload among judges, according to the 
report of the HVG, the huge disparities in the courts’ workload have not been eliminated or mitigated. 
 
2.4.2.5. Temporary national projects targeting timeliness 
In the present subsection, we set out two programs which have been developed at national level and 
targeted various issues relating to court activities. The main objective of the projects was to increase 
public confidence in courts. Within this general aim, a strong emphasis was put on handling delays 
and reducing the number of cases that had not been resolved within a two-year time. Both projects 
have attached consequences (awards) to the results that have been achieved by courts. 
 
In 2015, the President of the NOJ has launched a ten-point program called “Courts as Providers of 
Service” (A szolgáltató bíróságért!) which aimed, inter alia, to improve public trust and customer 
satisfaction regarding the judiciary and to enhance the timeliness and efficiency of the administration 
of justice. According to media reports, the President of the NOJ, when announcing the program 
publicly, stressed that to a certain extent, it was the increasing number of attacks on the judiciary, 
which had given rise to the initiative.74 However, we have no information about what the President 
of the NOJ exactly referred to. (In a few sensitive cases, some politicians – some of them being high-
ranking government officials – have criticized the judiciary heavily, putting somewhat political 
pressure on the courts.75 Also, judges were exposed to criticism from the media and the general public 
occasionally. Most of these challenges were unsubstantiated and lacked any well-founded legal 
arguments, but we do not know exactly if the President of the NOJ actually hinted at these attacks). 
 
The program targeted all segments of the administration of justice (court presidents just as individual 
judges, the legal profession as such, the government, public prosecutors and parties as well) to 
contribute to this joint enterprise of enhancing social respect of courts. Within this framework, the 
presidents of the courts were encouraged to develop action plans in order to promote the aim of 
timeliness. All regional and regional courts of appeal joined the agenda to achieve a radical drop (at 
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least 20 %) in the number of cases pending over 2 years before courts. It was a clearly identifiable 
performance target set by the central judicial administration to which courts were subjected. 
 
The program was completed by the end of March 2016, and proved highly successful. Within the ten-
month time frame, courts were able to reduce the overall number of cases pending excessively long 
(more than 2 years) by more than 25%.76 This means that the performance target was met. 
Nevertheless, we have only little information about how the other objectives of the program have 
been fulfilled. For that reason, it seems that the principal goal was to improve the figures on 
timeliness. 
 
Right after the end of this program, a new project called ‘Sustainable Development’ was announced 
by the central administration to maintain the results and the level of progress that have been achieved 
within the previous project. Timeliness and reducing delays were once again brought to the forefront 
in the action plans of the courts. If courts made commitments in their action plans to introduce other 
innovative measures (e.g. developing staff satisfaction surveys or number dispenser for customers) 
they were given extra scores within the project which increased the financial bonuses a court could 
receive. Those courts that performed well and met the targets and commitments they had made were 
rewarded by extra financial resources which were then distributed among individual judges at court 
level. The bonuses were paid to the judges according to their individual contribution to the overall 
performance of a given court. 
 
2.4.2.6. Customer satisfaction surveys 
The opinion of court users is of crucial importance in terms of the quality of justice. Consequently, 
the level of customer satisfaction can be a reliable indicator of the performance of the Hungarian 
judiciary. This indicator fits into the current objectives of judicial administration which aims to create 
a customer-friendly environment providing easy access for the users to the services of the courts. 
In the order no. 10/2012 (VI. 15.) the President of the NOJ issued a questionnaire through which the 
opinions and the feedbacks of the users can be collected.77 This questionnaire is not too ambitious in 
its original form as it includes only seven questions which can be measured on a five-grade scale. 
These questions focus on the topics of courthouse facilities (entrance system, security services etc.), 
access to information in court buildings, quality and timeliness of the services provided by the 
administrative staff, the measures taken for providing equal opportunities for users. 
 
While many courts use the original questionnaire developed by the NOJ, some have improved it to 
some extent and for instance, made it more detailed by breaking down the original questions to further 
elements. We have also found questionnaires that include questions on the performance of the judges, 
particularly on how judges communicate with the parties, or whether their instructions or judgments 
are comprehensible, and if they act in an impartial and objective manner. Some refined questionnaires 
also allow customers to make their own free comments to the respective questions. Some judges, 
nevertheless, raised their doubts whether customers’ opinions on the work of the judges can be seen 
as reliable feedbacks and called for caution when assessing such opinions. The results of some 
surveys are available on the internet and they provide information on the measures that have been 
taken to improve customer satisfaction.78 
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The NOJ have also examined the findings of the surveys and announced very favorable results. 
According to the 2015 annual report of the President of the NOJ, the users were satisfied with the 
services provided by courts up to 90%. 
 
However, we find only little information about how customers’ opinions have been channeled into 
the process of making administrative decisions at the regional and national level. Furthermore, it is 
striking that most of the standardized questionnaire do not contain questions concerning the trials and 
hearings. As a result, in most cases court users are not able to evaluate the very performance of the 
judges within this framework which makes the surveys less relevant in terms of the quality of justice. 
By judicial performance, we seek to refer here to those aspects of judicial behavior which are not 
subject to appeal (e. g. politeness, understandability etc.). 
 
Beside the questionnaire, courts have developed “Users’ Charter” in which they have laid down a 
few fundamental principles as minimum standards of the operation of courts. These principles 
concern mostly the issues that are raised in the satisfaction surveys and they are formulated in a very 
abstract language. Further undertakings involve, for instance, child-friendly operation of the court, 
more publicity on the work of the court, providing special hearing rooms for minor witnesses etc. 
Courts make a commitment to ensure the implementation of these standards, however, it is open to 
question if the Charter remains mere declaration, or entails real consequences on the functioning of 
the judiciary.  
 
2.4.2.7. Integrity and independence  
In 2016, the President of the NOJ issued an order aiming to ensure and strengthen the integrity of 
the judicial system.79 The new regulation seeks to establish an intra-institutional control mechanism 
within the judiciary which can contribute to reducing the risk of corruption and preventing those 
incidents which may compromise the independence of the judiciary. The regulation defines those 
situations in which the integrity and the independence of the judges can be undermined. (For instance, 
when judges have a second job, engage in political activity or receive gifts.) Nevertheless, many 
instances of “integrity-violation” are also handled within already existing criminal and disciplinary 
regulations which calls into question the necessity of issuing the “integrity regulation”.80 
 
The regulation has notably been enacted with regard to the need to enhance public trust in the judicial 
system. As to the rate of the citizens’ trust in the justice system, we lack any recent general domestic 
survey, so in this regard, we should rely on the surveys of the Eurobarometer and the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) which examined the perception of the general public and business entities on judicial 
independence. The Eurobarometer survey shows that in 2017 a little less than 50% of the citizens 
have a positive opinion on courts (48% saying that the independence of courts and judges is “very 
good” or “fairly good”) which is quite close to the EU average (55%) and ranks Hungary at the 
twentieth place among EU Member States, according to the 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard.81 More or 
less the same figure applies to the opinion of the companies on judicial independence in 2017; 
however, it is much better than the last year’s result, and closer to the EU average, therefore places 
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Hungary sixteenth on the 2017 Scoreboard. According to the survey of the WEF, businesses gave a 
score of 3.1 in a 1 to 7 scale which fits into a downward trend.82 
 
However, in the previous years, criminal proceedings against judges which can compromise the 
integrity of the justice system were rarely initiated. This fact also casts some doubts on whether there 
have been well-established grounds for introducing the integrity regulation.83 
The “integrity regulation” has been publicly criticized by some judges, since it says, inter alia, that 
the regulation aims to ensure the implementation of those values that are determined by the President 
of the NOJ in her capacity as the head of judicial administration. For some judges, this latter objective 
raises great concerns and may threaten the independence of the judicial branch, as it allows 
judicial behavior to be subjected to expectations determined unilaterally by the President of the NOJ. 
Therefore, judges have challenged the regulation before the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights.84 In a recent decision rendered by the Constitutional Court, some 
provisions of the integrity regulation have been found unconstitutional.85 
 
2.4.2.8. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
The practice of national and international human rights courts may also serve as a check on the quality 
of administration of justice in Hungary. These courts can supervise the performance of ordinary courts 
under the “fair trial” principle since constitutive elements of this principle such as “the length of 
proceedings” and the “reasoned judgment” criteria are closely related to the quality of adjudication. 
The ECtHR has found on several occasions that Hungary violated Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights as the length of the judicial proceedings were not compatible with the 
‘reasonable time’ requirement.86 The case-law of the ECtHR is likely to be a major factor in recent 
aspirations of the central judicial administration to improve the timeliness of adjudication. The annual 
reports of the NOJ explicitly mention the ECtHR jurisprudence relating to the “timeliness” 
standard and propose a more closer scrutiny of the practice of the Strasbourg tribunal in order that 
the findings of the ECtHR will be effectively incorporated into the administrative decisions and the 
operation of the Hungarian judiciary.87 As to the “reasoned judgment” criterion, we have no 
information if the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has ever been scrutinized in this regard by the judicial 
administration.  
 
2.4.3. Consequences of the evaluation of quality of justice at court level 
Currently, we have only little information about whether the evaluation process has any direct 
consequences on the courts budget or on the president of the court. If a court fails to comply with the 
fundamental requirements of the central administration, and serious shortcomings and malfunctions 
are revealed (huge backlog, delays etc.), the president of the court in question can be subjected to 
disciplinary proceedings, and disciplinary sanctions can be imposed on her. The most serious 
sanction (removal) is not used as presidents are more likely to resign than being dismissed. 
 
Well-performing courts can be rewarded by allocating additional resources to them. This was the 
case when courts were particularly successful in reducing backlog, primarily the number of old cases 
within some temporary projects that run in the previous years. Also, we can add to the list of 
consequences the symbolic rewards: for instance, when courts are named explicitly in the media or 
in the annual report of the NOJ as pioneers of “best practices”. 
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 2.4.4. Debate on possible reforms 
So far, the quality of adjudication has attracted only little theoretical interest in Hungary, so the issue 
has not been thoroughly studied by the academic community. Currently, a research group has been 
established at the University of Debrecen to map the so-called “Debrecen model”. We hope that this 
inquiry will boost research in this field. 
 
We have no information about any upcoming reform or other initiative that has been tabled by the 
Ministry of Justice. 
 
2.5. Resources allocation to courts 
2.5.1. Actors involved 
2.5.1.1. Legal background and main actors defined in laws 
Because of the special Hungarian institutional design (the judiciary is not connected to the Ministry 
of Justice, its administration is done by the NOJ), the budget of the courts is a separate chapter 
(Chapter VI.) within the state budget.88 Thus, formally the allocation of the budget is finally made 
by the decision of the Parliament, as a part of the law on State Budget (recently, for 2017 the Act XC 
of 2016). 
 
This process, and the actors are described in Article 76 (3) of the AOAC: 
(3) The President of the NOJ in his function related to the budget of courts: 
a) shall prepare a proposal for the budget for courts following consultation with the NCJ on 
the court chapter of the act regarding the central budget and the NOJ, and with the President 
of the Curia regarding the Curia, include a presentation of their opinion, and drafting a report 
for the implementation thereof; the Government shall present this proposal to Parliament 
unaltered, as part of the bill on the act on the central budget and the bill on the act for the 
implementation thereof; 
b) shall be invited to participate in the Government meetings and meetings of the Parliament 
Budget Committee debating the budget chapter (…)  
 
According to this text, besides the Parliament, the other three players in the formation of the budget 
are: 
- the President of the NOJ, who is preparing the budget proposal, 
- the President of the Curia, who is consulted on the budget of the Curia, 
- the NCJ which has a general consultation right. 
Among these actors, the President of the NOJ plays by far the most important role. 
 
The NCJ, which is the “control body of the central administration of courts”89, de iure has great 
power on the budget control, (as on everything). According to the law:  
(2) In the field of budget planning, NCJ: 
a) shall assess the proposal for the budget of courts and the report on the implementation 
thereof; 
b) shall monitor the financial management of the courts; and 
c) shall assess the detailed conditions for and the amount of other benefits.90 
                                                 
88 Section 4 of the AOAC states: “(t)he courts shall comprise an independent budget chapter in the act on the central 
budget. Within that chapter the Curia shall have its own title.” 
89 AOC Section 88  
90 AOC Section 103 (2)  
De facto, however, the NCJ’s role is quite formal. For example, from the 130 resolutions that were 
made by the council in 2016 only 3 were dealing with budgetary issues, and all three are one sentence 
long: namely, the body formally accepts the reports of the President of the NOJ.91 
 
2.5.1.2. Informal participants and actors 
There are also three other actors, not mentioned by the text of the law, but who are involved 
informally in the process:  
- The Ministry of Justice. It has been mentioned both by the Minister and the President of the 
NOJ several times that the Minister himself, and the Ministry is giving a strong support and 
arguments, when the lobbying process during the budget formulation is going on.  
- The practical, technical planning, budgeting process is done by the National Ministry of 
Economy, where the Department of Budgeting (which was previously the Ministry of 
Finance) is the key player.  
- Finally and most importantly, the final decision on the budget of the judiciary is made by the 
Prime Minister.92 
 
2.5.1.3. The budget of the court system in the context of the whole state budget 
Table 9: Court budget in Hungary per year 
 
In € 
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CC 
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costs 
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budget 
Courts' 
budget as 
a 
percentag
e of public 
expenditu
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2008 29 182 234  217 17 193  41 82% 0,80% 
2009 29 000 234 0,15% 216 18 196 1,78% 38 84% 0,81% 
2010* 44 107 228 -2,67% 210 18 189 -3,64% 39 83% 0,52% 
2011 47 092 242 6,24% 224 18 197 4,12% 45 81% 0,51% 
2012 48 896 258 6,65% 251 7 211 7,12% 48 82% 0,53% 
2013 52 284 279 8,09% 272 7 207 -1,80% 72 74% 0,53% 
2014 55 454 289 3,48% 282 7 209 0,89% 80 72% 0,52% 
2015 56 110 291 0,60% 283 7 206 -1,39% 85 71% 0,52% 
2016 54 963 300 3,31% 293 7 217 5,43% 83 72% 0,55% 
2017 47 644 321 6,81% 313 7 239 10,10% 82 75% 0,67% 
* The significant increase in the main sum in 2010 is due to some changes in the accounting policy.  
 
As it is visible from the table, the budget of the courts is constantly increasing since 2010 well 
above the inflation rate, so from this point of view the judicial system is one of the winner of the 
Orbán-government. This general statement, however is not entirely true for the personnel cost, which 
remained practically on the same level since 2002, and there was an increase only recently. It is not 
                                                 
91 Website of the decisions of the NCJ: http://birosag.hu/obt-dokumentumai-dontesek 
92 It is widely known, that the Prime Minister and the President of the NOJ were mates in the Bibó István College during 
their university years, though we have no information about how close this relationship is nowadays. Other sources are 
also supporting this information. Tünde Handó (President of the NOJ) stated in an interview, that the salary raise of the 
judges became possible after the Prime Minister’s „very nice speech” where he stated, that „it is very important that our 
salaries are fair and just, and as the country can step ahead, we can be sure that we can move ahead too” (“Inforádió” 
radio station, ”Arena” program, “Vendégünk Handó Tünde…” episode [“Our guest is TündeHandó”] 2016. 11.10.) 
http://inforadio.hu/arena/2016/11/10/vendegunk_hando_tunde_a_orszagos_birosagi_hivatal_elnoke/ (2. rész), (10:22 – 
11.05) 
visible from the table, but from 2012 the President of the NOJ succeeded to obtain additional 
resources for two purposes: the renovation of certain court buildings, and the working off the backlog 
in cases.  
 
2.5.2. Resources allocation process 
2.5.2.1. Theory and practice – the 2016 case 
Though formally the Parliament decides on the allocation of resources to the judiciary, as we 
mentioned above the process is more complicated. While other chapters are fiercely debated, there 
were no debates within the Parliament on the “court chapter”, except in 2016; this will be later 
detailed. 
 
This means, that theoretically (legally) the President of the NOJ should have to take nothing into 
consideration when designing the budget, and she could submit a proposal containing for example 
the double sum of the previous year. The reality however is more complicated, the process is not 
entirely an open one. There are serious limits of budget planning. 
 
First, the budget is planned by a “base approach”, i.e. taking last years’ budgetary figures into 
consideration as a starting point. The normal process is that these figures are increased with a certain 
percentage. 
 
Second, the increase itself is decided by the political sphere, practically by the prime minister, and 
his inner circle. This can be influenced, and sometimes it is influenced by the President’s actual 
arguments, or other factors we do not exactly know. For example, in the beginning of the 2010s, when 
the new system was enacted, the President had enough power to procure additional money for certain 
goals. These goals were explicitly written in the yearly state budgets (e.g. “Renovation of the Pest 
regional court building” – 2012-2014 budgets, or “More clerks for the acceleration of judicial 
processes” – 2012 budget). The budget of the judiciary – as we mentioned above – was increased 
above 5% yearly, while the inflation rate was well below this level. 
 
However, we know very little about the real planning process. Sometimes stories emerge, when 
there are turbulences within the system. On 13.05.2016 the opposition led chairman of the budget 
commission of the Parliament in his speech quoted the letter of the President of the NOJ, where the 
President wrote, that the “budget proposal she received is entirely different from the one that has been 
submitted to the parliament”.93 The difference was that in the original budget there was a 5% increase 
planned for salary raise. The mistake has been corrected. A week later the President of the NOJ has 
been heard by the Budgetary Committee. Here, she said that “from the 13 000 employees that are 
employed by the court system, more than 2500 get the base salary. Sometimes it happens, that a shelf-
stacker job is more attractive than a clerk’s in the judicial system”. 
 
Apart from the particular events, the whole story shows, that the NOJ President’s room for 
maneuvering is not as big as it is written in the text of the law.  
 
2.5.2.2. Internal and external budget allocation 
The allocation of the budget means two things. 
 
                                                 
93Speech of Sándor Burány (Socialist Party) at 13.05. 2017. (#78. speech at 14:00) http://www.parlament.hu/folyamatban-
levo-
torvenyjavaslatok?p_auth=iG7GGveF&p_p_id=pairproxy_WAR_pairproxyportlet_INSTANCE_9xd2Wc9jP4z8&p_p_
lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_count=1&_
pairproxy_WAR_pairproxyportlet_INSTANCE_9xd2Wc9jP4z8_pairAction=%2Finternet%2Fcplsql%2Fogy_naplo.na
plo_fadat%3Fp_ckl%3D40%26p_uln%3D152%26p_felsz%3D78%26p_szoveg%3D%26p_felszig%3D78 
What has been discussed until now is the external determination of the budget: the formation process 
of the main numbers, figures will be later included in the state budget. The determination of this 
number, as indicated above, is an eminently political process in Hungary. The arguments that are 
used for increasing the amount are mainly quantitative arguments: worn out buildings, low salaries, 
and primarily the speeding up of the judicial processes, as well as working off the backlog. While the 
President’s reports contain a lot of qualitative elements, like training of the judges, “open court 
program” etc., in budgetary issues visibly the quantitative, material arguments are more effective. 
Finally, it is very probable, that the overall budget number de facto is decided by the Prime Minister 
and his inner circle, and planned by the Ministry of National Economy, though de jure this should 
be the task and responsibility of the President of the NCJ. 
 
The other aspect of the budgetary issues is the internal allocation of the sum available for the courts. 
This is not an entirely free process, since the whole system has serious determinations.  
 
- The main determination is, that more than 70% of the total budget is spent on salaries, and 
taxes and social contributions connected to salaries. Since these amounts are determined by 
the Status Act, here there is very limited room for maneuvering. However, the allocation of 
the staff itself – the so-called statuses (judges and clerks) – is still an issue (see below).94 
- Some 10% of the budget should be allocated to “material costs” which are mainly the cost 
elements of processes that cannot be allocated to the parties. (Like court experts’ costs, that 
are arisen in procedures where the litigants are not charged.)  
- Some 15-20% of the total budget, (20-30 Mln €) is subject to bargain, or budgetary 
decisions. Due to the fact, that we had no possibility to make interviews with the President, 
or with people who are taking part of this process we have only scarce and scattered 
information from the annual reports of the President (see below).  
 
2.5.2.3. Decision about the allocation of the staff 
Personnel costs represent the highest amount within the budget. Therefore, the allocation of the staff 
is one of the most important issues within the judiciary. 
 
Before 2011, the biggest problem of the judiciary was the imbalanced workload, where the workload 
of the judges working in the Budapest Capital Regional Court was 40% higher than in any other court. 
We think this was one of the main reasons of the formation of the recent system. Between 2012-2013, 
the President of the NOJ was empowered to reallocate the cases from the competent court to other 
courts where the workload was lower. As mentioned before, this practice was exercised on an ad hoc 
basis, therefore raised grave constitutional concerns, so this solution was finally aborted. Then the 
President of the NOJ, beside the temporary transfer of judges from one court to another (judicial 
secondment), has chosen a more effective, but very “hand-made” solution. In this system, the 
allocation of human resources is entirely centralized. In 2014, the President made a resolution, 
283/2014. (VII. 2.) OBHE (NOJ President’s resolution)95, which is an eight-page document, enlisting 
all the regional courts, and the “permitted number of FTE” in each court per 10 job types, from the 
judges to the administrators. This solution practically means that any change within the number of 
job positions is possible only if this resolution is changed by the President. So, the management of 
the job positions within the judiciary is totally centralized. 
                                                 
94The 240 Mln € seems to be a high amount but in reality – compared to other EC countries, according to the CEPEJ 
report – salaries of the judges and the other staff in Hungary are very low. Concerning the salaries of the beginner judges 
there is only one country within the EU where the salaries are lower - Bulgaria. The gross average salary quota (beginners’ 
salary compared to the average salary) is also one of the worst, taking the poorer countries into consideration. (European 
judicial systems - Efficiency and quality of justice - CEPEJ STUDIES No. 23 - Edition 2016 (2014 data), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2016/publication/CEPEJ%
20Study%2023%20report%20EN%20web.pdf 110.  
95See: http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/obh/dokumentumok/283_0.pdf 
 According to our sources, not just the changes in number of job positions is centralized, but also the 
decision on filling the vacant positions is entirely depending on the discretion of the President 
of the NOJ. This information, however, seems to be at odds with information on establishing “ratio 
tables” for making well-founded decisions in the process of filling vacancies. (see section 2.4.2.4.)  
According to the 2015 Report any job advertisement is preceded by a permission process:  
“In this process the following parameters are examined: the manpower limit (cap) of the court, 
the caseload dynamics (change over time), and the workload of the judges. Based on these 
parameters a decision is made, whether the job vacancy is advertised locally, or in another 
court.” 
 
Another way of disencumbering the judges is to empower the clerks to certain activities, where judges 
are not needed. In certain respects this also happened, and is happening at the moment.96 
Despite all of its limitations, this “micro-management” method seems to work. At the end of 2011 
the average caseload of a judge was 112, and 157 at the Budapest Capital Regional Court. By the end 
of 2015 the respective figures were 78 and 80. This drop is spectacular. 
 
According to the report of the President of the NOJ, a software is under construction which will 
register all the positions, the number of vacancies, the gross personnel spending, and therefore an 
“optimal distribution of resources will be possible. (… where) more detailed quotas can be determined 
that how many clerks, and other office jobs, helping the judges’ work is needed”97. We have no further 
information on the implementation of the software. 
 
2.5.2.4. Allocation of resources – internal budgetary bargains and other issues 
As we mentioned above the other aspect of the internal resource management and allocation is the 
allocation of the 15-20% of “free” money. These resources are mainly aimed for renovation, or ad 
hoc remunerations etc. Though the report of the President mentions a series of “budget meetings, 
where the NOJ meets the presidents of the local courts and the financial officers” and where 
“structured discussions” are taking place, we have no further information about these discussions and 
meetings. According to our information the real process is that the president is deciding practically 
on every important issue. 
 
We have to mention here, that, according to the yearly reports, there are some further efforts and 
projects going on to improve the financial management of the courts. For example, the 2015 report 
speaks about the introduction of a new controlling software, which is providing real time 
information about the financial status of the courts. It is also mentioned here, that the quantity of ad 
hoc information which had to be provided by court leaders (rather stressful task) between 2012 and 
2014 has been also reduced. A further initiative is, that a monitoring system was enacted (no further 
info on that) and sample regulations (model rules) were introduced in the financial field.  
 
2.5.3. Consequences of resource allocation on quality of justice in Hungary 
It is clear, that the resource allocation process (both the financial and the human resources) has two 
features in Hungary:  
- it is a political process 
- it is highly centralized, where the key player is the President of the NOJ  
 
It is dominated by the politics, because  
- there are no rules, and guarantees for a minimum budget  
                                                 
96 2015 Report, 15.  
97 2015 Report, 112. 
- there is no other guarantee for any element of the budget 
- budget decisions on the whole judiciary is made formally by the Parliament, but practically 
by the Prime Minister, and his inner circle.  
 
The internal resource allocation is over-centralized, because 
- according to the reports the disposable 15-20% of the total budget is distributed on budget 
meetings, but we have no further information on these meetings. According to our information 
these decisions are mainly made by the President of the NOJ 
- allocation of human resources is formally centralized by a Presidential resolution; no human 
resource decision can be made without the consent of the President of the NOJ 
- NCJ has a formal role, it is practically not controlling the President of the NOJ on budgetary 
issues.  
Despite of its over-politicization there were two serious improvements in the resource allocation field 
in Hungary. 1. The backlog of cases has been successfully reduced 2. The inequalities in workload 
– where the burden of the capital courts was 40% higher than other courts – have also been reduced. 
 
Still, the over-politicization, and over-centralization is dangerous, because there are practically no 
institutional and legal control over the President. As long as she is using this power for “enlightened” 
purposes it is good, but as soon as a greater political pressure or any budgetary restraints appear, this 
can have a direct and fast dangerous impact on the whole system.  
 
2.6. Assessment of existing evaluation methods 
The picture on the existing assessment methods is very complex. The evaluation process of individual 
judges is greatly elaborated as it incorporates a wide range of indicators regarding the adjudication, 
regarding both quality and quantity. The scheme could be appropriate to address all the skills and 
competences that are crucial for high-quality judicial work. However, as mentioned earlier, it is a 
long-established practice that the assessment is carried out by the professional superiors of the 
examined judges. Therefore, although it has not yet been invented in the world better method to check 
the quality of justice than “human” evaluation, factors such as personal relationship, dependency 
and prior knowledge can compromise the integrity of the process and the objectivity of the results. 
 
While ‘quality-considerations’ play, in principle, a significant role in the evaluation of the judges, 
this aspect of adjudication is largely neglected when the performance of the courts is at issue. This 
latter process is dominated by quantitative standards (backlog, timeliness, resolved cases etc.), and 
even if efficiency can be conceived as an indicator of quality: namely, that of good functioning of the 
courts, further qualitative elements are much less addressed. Nevertheless, we experience the efforts 
of the judiciary to develop more refined and sophisticated methods of assessment to obtain reliable 
information on the operation of the judiciary. Many of the new initiatives – e.g. satisfaction surveys, 
stylebook – now focus more on quality than efficiency. 
 
The situation in the field of judicial quality control in Hungary (as in other countries, too) is strongly 
connected to the traditional and deeply embedded cultural and political image of judges and all jurists. 
The underlying concept in Hungary is that judges as all other legal practitioners are high-qualified 
professionals such as doctors, engineers etc. That is why they can be assessed by using only internal-
professional standards and they are mostly measured by productivity standards in a hierarchical way. 
The system of legal education in Hungary supports this model of quality control both directly and 
indirectly. On the one hand legal education puts emphasis on the text of the laws and on legal-
doctrinal knowledge and cares much less about the social responsibility of lawyers and improving 
their ‘soft skills’. On the other hand the exams are extremely text(book)-oriented (it is often required 
to recite the text of the law by heart in front of the teacher), there is very little room for team-work, 
essay writing and moot-court activities. This hierarchical, productivity-oriented approach is similar 
to the assessment of judges. That is why it is not a surprise that court users’ opinions do not matter in 
the course of evaluation. 
 
3. Innovative practices in quality evaluation and quality development 
3.1. System of mentor judges 
As a recent development in Hungarian courts a mentor-judge network operates. Junior judges that 
need legal-professional support may turn to senior judges registered as “mentors”. Unfortunately, 
we have no data on the number of junior judges who use this opportunity. On the one hand mentor 
system can be a good initiative for the personal improvement of junior judges. It is so because a newly 
appointed judge has to adjudicate as a single decision-maker even in quite complicated and difficult 
cases. (At the same time, senior judges in appellate courts review the junior judges’ verdicts in panels 
generally consist of three experienced judges. In our opinion this situation can hardly be justified.) 
On the other hand, being a “mentored” judge proved to be a “stigma” on judges who enlist in this 
program. Another question to be answered: who bears the professional responsibility if a junior judge 
makes a faulty decision based on the advice of the mentor judge? 
 
3.2. EU law consultant network 
Since 2012 a special organization is functioning under the umbrella of NCJ, the network of EU law 
consultant judges. Originally the initiative was started after the EU accession as a series of trainings, 
but later the group of trainers formed an informal network, and finally in 2012 the new President 
created a formal structure out of it. 
 
Recently the network consists of 54 judges from around the country, and from different courts. They 
receive a working time reduction, and 10% extra remuneration. Their main task is the consultation 
locally in legal matters affected by EU law. A “side effect” of the network is, that the members of 
the network are representing the Hungarian judiciary in foreign forums, and conferences. 
 
The network holds compulsory trainings twice a year, which are two days long. One day is held in 
English. The topics are comprised of different EU law fields. The participation is compulsory for the 
members of the network, which is registered by the coordinator (leader) of the network. For example, 
recently a training was held on legal aspects of EU migration law. 
 
The participants should self-educate themselves, and quarterly upload a report, and a self-assessment 
on an online form. Their activities (advice given, presentations, publication activity) should be 
registered here. This system is not only a tool for the performance measurement, but, since the 
advising activity (in the EU law problems that have arisen) is also registered, it gives a territorial and 
per court overview on the everyday EU legal problems of the courts as well. 
 
3.3. The principles of drafting: the ‘Stylebook’ 
In 2013 a jurisprudence-analysis group was set up to deliver inquiries into the drafting practice of 
the Curia judges in civil and administrative cases. A similar group was created in criminal matters 
a year later. 
 
Since the structure of decisions and their linguistic and stylistic level varied from one judge to another 
to a great extent, the objectives of the working group were to improve the drafting-style, the 
uniformity and the comprehensibility of judgments in order to meet the expectations of the general 
public. The analysis addressed five issues concerning the drafting of decisions: spelling/grammar, 
style, citations, structure, and the substance of the judgment. Although the “drafting group” 
concentrated exclusively on the practice of the Curia, it was assumed that the proposed changes would 
likely affect the practice of lower courts, at least indirectly. 
 As a result of the analysis, a report has been published on the website of the Curia which first 
highlighted the fundamental shortcomings of drafting practices (e.g. the divergent and 
incomprehensible internal structure of the judgments, obsolete linguistic terms, long and intricate 
arguments and redundancies in the text, the great variation of citation methods etc.). Then, it made 
some moderate proposals to enhance the uniformity of the language, style and structure of judgments. 
The report suggested, inter alia, the standardization of the description of the subject-matters of the 
cases, the rationalization of citing previous decisions, the introduction of an internal numbering to the 
reasoning part, or compliance with the linguistic demands of the heterogeneous target audience. The 
report also proposed some changes to the substance of the reasoning, but some of them – for 
instance, avoiding reference to legal literature or the establishment of novel legal doctrines, and 
refraining from addressing the parties’ arguments which do not affect the decision – were highly 
surprising. 
The “Stylebook” which contains some samples for drafting was published only on the intranet of the 
judiciary. The “Stylebook” is not compulsory. It is only recommended for the Curia, and we know 
little about its actual impact on the drafting practices of the courts. The Curia has already started to 
use this “style guide”, and we were told that some lower courts are now doing the same. Recently, 
the work of the jurisprudence-analysis groups has been communicated to courts to make their activity 
and results known for the entire judicial branch. These latter developments might reflect the very first 
steps of a process of gradual implementation. 
 
Some of these issues concerning drafting were also raised in the medium-term institutional strategy 
of the Curia which was adopted in 2013.98 In this document the emphasis was put particularly on the 
structure of reasoning aiming to facilitate the transparency and the persuasive force of the 
justification part of the judgment. The strategy also considered crucial that the arguments provided 
by courts may be understandable for the general public. The strategy recommended the main 
principles of drafting and the fundamental standards of linguistic and stylistic clarity to be determined 
by the President of the Curia in the medium term. 
 
3.4. Best practices: The “Debrecen Model” – a bottom-up initiative to promote timeliness 
In recent years, a new strategy aiming to improve the timeliness and the quality of adjudication has 
been developed in the District Court of Debrecen in criminal cases. The project was launched in the 
early 2014 and is built on three pillars: (1) timely and effective administration of justice, (2) staff 
satisfaction and (3) customer satisfaction. The new management system was developed as a response 
to the previous years’ unfavorable trends in the court’s performance: the court faced huge backlog, 
and the number of the cases pending more than 2 years before the court was also extremely high, 
according to the statistical data of the early 2010’s. The project targeted a comprehensive change in 
the attitude of the staff, in all segments of the functioning of the court. A novel method of case 
allocation was introduced to provide incentives for judges to complete cases and make their work 
more effective. The former scheme was based on the system of “case equalization” in the level of 
individual judges: each judge had to deal with the same number of cases which meant that judges 
were not motivated to resolve cases as the more cases they resolved, the more they got. This scheme 
was replaced by a case allocation system which builds on the idea that judges receive the average 
number of incoming cases in every month (regardless of the number of cases she finished in the 
previous month) with special emphasis on the different difficulty of the cases to be assigned (the 
guiding principle is “equal number of cases with equal weight”). 
 
                                                 
98The Medium-Term Institutional Strategy of the Curia, available at 
kuria-birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allamiprojekt/kuria_imprimaturahoz.pdf 
This system implies that if a judge performs well and completes cases effectively, she can save time. 
She will not get extra cases if she finishes more cases than other judges. It was the District Court of 
Debrecen which first embarked on applying “case weights” in the process of case allocation: weights 
are established to each particular incoming case and these weights are taken into account in the course 
of case allocation in order to ensure a balanced workload among individual judges. Case weights in 
a slightly amended form were later implemented nationwide and today serve as the basis of the “case 
registry”. Apart from establishing a more fine-tuned system of case allocation based on case weights, 
novel methods of monitoring and administrative control over judicial activities have been introduced 
which include, for instance, the tight monitoring of old cases pending over 2 years before the court, 
inspection visit to the hearings by senior judges, informal discussions with judges on the adequate 
and effective methods of organizing work etc. 
 
Besides, a complex motivational system has also been elaborated which is directly linked to the 
performance of the judges. It is a great innovation in itself that the “Debrecen model” deliberately 
creates a wide range of incentives to motivate judges to carry out their work effectively. As a result, 
outstanding performance is recognized and rewarded by free time (holiday) which can be spent – 
according to the choice of the judge concerned – on preparation for hearings, drafting judgments, 
trainings, language learning, or study trips abroad etc. 
 
Statistical data reveals that the number of cases pending over 2 years has dropped significantly since 
the model was introduced, namely from 8,6 % to 2,79% in a two-year time. Further figures show that 
beside the substantial decrease in the old cases, the backlog of the court in general has been reduced 
considerably in the last few years. (The number of pending cases was reduced from 1812 to 787 by 
the beginning of 2016.) The spectacular performance regarding case completion concerned both easy 
and complex cases. 
 
Within the “Debrecen model” a lot of emphasis is put on staff satisfaction. This is reflected by the 
abovementioned motivational system and other novel instruments such as the regular needs 
assessment of the employees regarding the working conditions, the motivational questionnaires 
targeting the future plans of staff members for their individual career paths, or other measures put in 
place to provide a friendly working environment. 
 
Customer satisfaction as the third pillar of the “Debrecen model” is sought to be improved through 
satisfaction surveys which are assessed on an annual basis. 
 
The “Debrecen model” has recently been subjected to a comprehensive scholarly analysis in order to 
reveal those features of the model that can be implemented by other courts. The study seeks to explore 
how the introduction of the new model has affected other areas of the quality of administering justice 
at the District Court of Debrecen. 
  
   
 
